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Reporting practice, impression management and company performance: A longitudinal 
and comparative analysis of water leakage disclosure 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to determine whether corporate reporting practice, consistent with 
impression management, changes depending upon company performance. A longitudinal 
analysis, rarely used in prior impression management research, enables changes in annual 
report disclosures, both narrative and visual, to be identified and considered relative to a 
company’s performance. Our analysis is based upon the disclosure of leakage performance, a 
strategic and stakeholder issue in the water industry, by all ten water and sewerage companies 
(WASCs) in England and Wales over the seven year period 2005-06 to 2011-12. Our 
longitudinal data is also compared across companies and contrasted with the expert counter-
account provided by the industry regulator, OFWAT. We find that the level, nature and 
presentation of a WASC’s leakage disclosures change markedly reflective of their 
performance against OFWAT’s target. Our evidence shows that the changes in reporting 
practice include the use of tactics and presentational methods consistent with impression 
management, raising concerns regarding the balance and trustworthiness of voluntary 
disclosures in the annual report. We suggest that the IASB should further consider their 
guidance on narrative disclosures, including presentational format, to reduce the scope for 
impression management within corporate reporting. 
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Introduction 
Annual reports ‘are intended to be a legitimate and trustworthy medium through which 
management communicate information’ (Yuthas et al. 2002, p. 141), but they have also been 
criticised as being ‘a highly sophisticated product of the corporate design environment, the 
main purpose of which is to proactively construct a particular visibility and meaning’ by 
communicating ‘a picture of the organisation’ (Stanton and Stanton 2002, p.478 and see 
Hines 1988, Hopwood 1996, McKinstry 1996). Further, the ‘front-end narrative’ disclosures 
within annual reports have been identified as either a potentially important and valuable 
source of corporate information to investors and other users (Clatworthy and Jones 2003, 
Beattie et al. 2004a, Solomon and Solomon 2006, Kent and Zunker 2013) or, and of 
pertinence to this study, assumed to include ‘managerial discretionary disclosure choices 
[that] are opportunistic and constitute impression management’ (Merkl-Davis and Brennan 
2007, p. 117).  
Impression management has been argued to be the process by which management convey 
their specification of reality through narrative, quantitative and visual disclosures in the 
annual report both to manage the corporate image and to report the performance of 
management (see Hines 1988, Stanton and Stanton 2002, Samkin and Schneider 2010, 
Merkl-Davies et al. 2011). From this perspective annual reports are ‘instruments of 
impression management’ (Arndt and Bigelow 2000, p. 501) whereby disclosures are self-
serving (Neu et al. 1998) in presenting the organisation and its management in its best light 
and shaping organisational audiences’ perceptions (Aerts 1994, Stanton and Stanton 2002, 
Aerts 2005, Brennan et al. 2009, Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2011). More bluntly, Dhanani 
and Connolly (2012, p. 1144) asserted that disclosures in annual reports can be viewed as a 
‘misspecification of organisational reality’.  This raises broader concerns regarding the trust-
worthiness of the annual report (ICAS 2013, ICAEW 2013) and questions the expectation 
that corporate narrative disclosures (or the management commentary) will be ‘neutral’ and 
‘possess the fundamental qualitative characteristics of relevance and faithful representation’ 
(IASB 2010, p. 10). 
 
This research aims to provide evidence, if any, of impression management within the 
narrative section of annual reports. It is motivated by two specific challenges within the 
accounting literature. First, it examines ‘whether the use of IM [impression management] 
varies depending on firm performance’ (Brennan et al. 2009, 824). Previous studies have 
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considered how narrative disclosures in annual reports differ between successful and 
unsuccessful firms as measured by earnings (see Yuthas et al. 2002, Clatworthy and Jones 
2003) and how the use of graphs and photographs throughout sustainability reports differ 
between sustainability leading companies and those that are less sustainability driven (see 
Hrasky 2012). These studies, however, have adopted a cross-sectional approach such that the 
reporting practices of successful firms are compared to those of unsuccessful firms over a 
single time period. Such cross sectional studies can provide insight between firms’ reporting 
practices in a given year. 
 
In contrast, Beattie et al. (2008) note that longitudinal studies provide an opportunity to study 
innovation and change in reporting practice. Evidence has been found that reporting practice 
may change in response to increasing stakeholder awareness (Samkin and Schneider 2010) 
and pressure (Neu et al. 1998) and to a change in CEO (Godfrey et al. 2003). Of more 
specific relevance to our study is the opportunity to examine how changes in reporting 
practice may, or may not, depend on an organisation’s own performance. To our knowledge 
Beattie and Jones (2000a), Aerts (2001) and Courtis (2004) are the only impression 
management studies that specifically consider how a company’s reporting practice is related 
to its performance. We agree with Beattie and Jones (2000a) that analysis of such 
longitudinal data provides a ‘more efficient’ (p. 217) approach and that it ‘provides a more 
powerful test of the manipulation hypothesis than do previous cross-sectional studies’ 
(p.224). The additional efficiency and power is provided by such longitudinal data naturally 
controlling for contextual and organisation-specific variables (see Campbell and Rahman 
2010) and making management’s discretionary changes to reporting more visible. Moreover, 
any such changes are set within the context whereby reporting practice can be considered as 
‘unadaptive’ due to ‘inertial forces’ (Aerts 2001, p. 5). These prior studies, however, are 
limited in scope to a consideration of financial graphs (Beattie and Jones 2000a), attributional 
statements (Aerts 2001) and the use of colour (Courtis 2004).  
 
The second challenge to which this paper responds is for future research to take a more 
‘holistic’ research approach to enable ‘a fuller picture of reporting practices’ to be obtained 
(Brennan et al. 2009, p. 818) ‘in pursuit of evidence of impression management’ (ibid. p. 
823). This paper, therefore, brings together a wide range of impression management tactics 
and presentational methods into a single framework. Whereas prior studies have tended to 
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focus upon a smaller number of impression management tactics or presentational methods, 
our study utilises this broader framework enabling us to consider impression management as 
a complex and multi-faceted practice (Ogden and Clarke 2005, Brennan et al. 2009). In doing 
so, we consider both narrative and visual (for instance graphics, tables and photographs) 
disclosure and hence address Dhanani and Connolly (2012, p. 1161) who commented: ‘future 
research may also examine the expressive powers of the visual which appeared to play a 
critical role to complement the narrative information’ (and see Campbell et al. 2009, Davison 
2011).  
 
We do this through a longitudinal analysis of disclosures made within the narrative sections 
of the annual reports of each of the ten Water and Sewerage Companies (WASCs) operating 
in England and Wales for the period from 2005-06 to 2011-12. We focus upon how the 
WASCs report upon their water leakage performance, a key regulatory metric. Our analysis 
of the WASC’s leakage disclosures is augmented by comparing it directly with OFWAT’s 
independent commentary on the WASC’s leakage performance. Most prior studies examining 
disclosures have solely focussed on the annual report and have not sought to contrast this 
company based view, or impression emergent from this, against a comparative account. A 
small number of other studies (see for example: Adams 2004, Boiral 2013) have used media 
coverage and news events, as sources of ‘counter accounting’. Each of these studies used 
‘negative’ media coverage of social and/or environmental issues as a means of assessing the 
completeness and transparency of the related reporting. We believe that the OFWAT’s 
commentaries are of particular value, as they provide an informed and expert counter account 
of the WASCs’ leakage performance irrespective of whether it is good or bad. 
Perhaps surprisingly, even in the UK in recent years water scarcity1 has resulted in 
disruptions to supply and restrictions on water usage. The levels of water leakage have been 
implicated in these problems2 such that the industry regulator (OFWAT) identifies leakage as 
a ‘serious’ and ‘important’ issue for the industry (OFWAT, 2011). In recognition of this 
1 More broadly, the importance of water scarcity, to which water leakage contributes, has been recognised by 
the UN as a global problem (see http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml last accessed on 7 August 
2014). 
2 For instance, it was reported that ‘after two years of low rainfall, drought has been declared across southern 
and central England, with no end in sight for the hosepipe ban imposed in many places’ (guardian.co.uk 7 May 
2012). The same report states that ‘every day 3.4 billion litres of water leaks from the system, almost a quarter 
of the entire supply’.  
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OFWAT sets annual leakage targets3 for each WASC (Hopkinson et al. 2000) as part of their 
price determination review. If a WASC misses its leakage targets, and exceptional 
circumstances not accepted, OFWAT has a number of regulatory actions at its disposal. 
These include requiring the WASCs to provide detailed quarterly reports, to use enforcement 
orders and, from April 2005, to fine companies for consistently failing to meet their leakage 
target. The seriousness of water reporting to the regulator is highlighted by the £35.8 million 
fine issued by OFWAT in 2007-08 to Severn Trent for misreporting prior leakage data 
submitted to OFWAT between 2002 and 2005. Even more significantly in financial terms is 
that, in our period of study, the companies’ leakage performance is one of the factors that 
OFWAT considers when determining the price that the WASCs can charge their customers. 
In 2009 OFWAT’s ‘Overall Performance Assessment related price adjustments’ were such 
that each company’s price cap was subject to a one-off adjustment ranging from +0.5% to      
-1.0% (Ofwat 2009b). 
Furthermore, leakage has been identified as a priority issue by consumers (Consumer Council 
2007, 2013) and as having the potential to cause ‘significant environmental damage’ to rivers 
and wetlands (Select Committee on Public Accounts 2001). Thus leakage is an important and 
emotive issue, which impacts upon customers and the natural environment, but also has 
regulatory, efficiency and financial implications for the WASCs. Moreover the WASCs 
recognise the ability to meet their leakage target as an important reputational issue: 
 
‘The failure to meet the 2005/06 leakage target, while needing to impose a hosepipe ban as a 
result of the drought, led to much critical comment from the media and other stakeholders. 
The Company’s reputation has suffered as a result, and research indicates that most of this 
is related to perceptions of performance on leakage. A sustained improvement in the 
Company’s reputation must start with achieving significant long-term reductions in leakage’ 
(Thames Water annual report 2007, p. 9, emphasis added by authors) 
 
We argue, therefore, that water leakage and in particular performance against OFWAT’s 
target are salient issues for the WASCs and their stakeholders. Moreover, and consistent with 
prior studies (Ogden and Clarke 2005, Crowther et al. 2006, Samkin and Schneider 2010), we 
expect that information relating to such salient issues will be disclosed in annual reports, as 
companies seek to inform shareholders and wider publics of their financial and non-financial 
performance. This context provides us with an opportunity to examine whether firms change 
3 In setting leakage targets OFWAT do not consider it economic to eliminate leakage altogether, as the cost of 
this would outweigh the benefits. 
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their reporting practice, consistent with impression management, when their related 
performance changes.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review the impression management 
literature relevant to reporting practice. It also draws upon wider literature, such as social and 
environmental accounting, that has contributed empirical evidence of similar phenomena 
albeit from different theoretical perspectives. From this review, we present a consolidated 
impression management framework. We then set out the research method adopted followed 
by the presentation of the findings. Finally we offer discussion and conclusions, the 
implications of our study and areas for further research. 
 
Impression management and reporting practice  
Numerous impression management tactics and presentational methods have been identified in 
the accounting and wider literature. Tedeschi and Melburg (1984) provide an initial, although 
not comprehensive, classification scheme categorising impression management into assertive 
and defensive tactics. Assertive tactics proactively seek to establish a particular identity or 
traits which are valued by an audience.  In contrast, the use of defensive tactics is often a 
reaction to a ‘predicament’, whereby undesirable traits have been attributed to the actor(s). 
Drawing upon elements of Tedeschi and Melburg’s (1984) framework examples of both 
assertive (ingratiation4, self-promotion, exemplification, entitlement and enhancement) and 
defensive (dissociation, excuse, justification, apology and restitution) impression 
management tactics have been evidenced within the annual reports of public sector 
organisations such as hospitals (Arndt and Bigelow 2000) and private and listed companies 
(Aerts 2001, 2005) including regulated utilities (Ogden and Clarke 2005).  
 
Evidence of an additional defensive tactic, concealment (Abrahamson and Park 1994, Arndt 
and Bigelow 2000, Dhanani and Connolly 2012) has also been found in the accounting and 
management literature. Merkl-Davies et al. (2011, p. 318) suggest an example of concealment 
is ‘displaying positive organisational outcomes more prominently than negative 
organisational outcomes (e.g. by means of positioning or highlighting)’. Similarly, Dhanani 
and Connolly (2012, p. 1144) suggest that concealment is ‘when management chooses to 
4 Tedeschi and Melburg (1984) identify four specific ingratiation tactics, which are ‘self-enhancing 
communications, other enhancing communications, opinion conformity, and favour-doing’ (ibid, p. 38). 
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downplay or withhold negative, material information while disclosing less relevant, positive 
information.’ The reference here to withholding negative, material information is also 
apparent in their contention that concealment ‘refers to situations where management chooses 
to omit bad news items’ (ibid. p.1144). Concerns over the absence of accounting (see 
Choudhury 1998, Catasús 2008), absence of reporting (see in particular Adams 2004, Belal 
and Cooper 2011, Boiral 2013), and ‘thematic manipulation’ (Brennan et al. 2009) of 
disclosures to good news (see for instance Neu et al. 1998, Kent and Zunker 2013) has 
already been identified in the wider, particularly social and environmental, accounting 
literature, but, to date, it has been conflated with concealment in the impression management 
literature. In this research we more clearly distinguish between omission and concealment as 
two separately identifiable defensive tactics.  
 
On the whole, the studies considered thus far have provided examples of how disclosures 
within corporate reports use assertive tactics, particularly self-promotion, enhancement, 
entitlement and exemplification to attribute an organisation’s success to internal factors and 
make use of defensive tactics, particularly dissociation, concealment, excuses and 
justifications, in response to negative events (Arndt and Bigelow 2000, Aerts 2001, 2005, 
Ogden and Clarke 2005, Dhanani and Connolly 2012). A further tactic not considered in the 
above studies is where management can be ‘selective’ in choosing which performance 
numbers to report and what ‘performance comparisons’ to make (Brennan et al. 2009). There 
is cross-sectional evidence to suggest that both the selection of performance numbers and 
choice of ‘benchmarks’ is biased to accentuate improved performance in earnings 
announcements (Schrand and Walther 2000), press releases (Guillamon-Saorin et al. 2012) 
and in the Chairman’s statements of annual reports (Clatworthy and Jones 2006). Table 1 
provides definitions of the impression management tactics as drawn from the extant literature 
and used within this research. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Further presentational approaches to impression management of narrative disclosures have 
been studied in the accounting literature. Brennan et al. (2009) identify syntactical 
manipulation, rhetorical manipulation, and visual effects (emphasis) as impression 
management methods. There is considerable evidence of syntactical and rhetorical 
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manipulation being used within annual reporting (see for example: Courtis 1998, Clatworthy 
and Jones 2001, Sydserff and Weetman 2002, Courtis 2004), which relates to language and 
linguistic choices made by those individuals undertaking impression management. Managers 
may obfuscate by using rhetorical language that is ‘persuasive/convincing/credible’ (ibid, p. 
795) and through syntactic manipulation whereby more complex words and sentences are 
used in the reporting of negative performance. In this way negative messages are less easily 
understood by the audience. More generally, obfuscation, which is often measured through 
textual and syntactic complexity, relates to the clarity of disclosures and can include non-
linguistic devices (Rutherford 2003). One particular form of bias is the increased use of self-
referencing (I or we) when reporting more positive messages (Li, 2010). Brennan et al. 
(2009) identify how impressions of narrative disclosures can be managed through visual 
techniques. Emphasis of positive messages within the text can be provided visually, for 
instance through the use of colour or larger font size. There is limited evidence of such visual 
effects, but Jameson (2000), whilst drawing upon narrative theory rather than impression 
management, found that they were present in a cross-sectional study of the shareholder 
reports of both top-return and mixed-return equity mutual funds. Emphasis can also be 
achieved through repeating positive messages and locating them in prominent positions. 
Bowen et al. (2005) have found that ‘metrics that are more value-relevant and portray more 
favourable firm performance’ are emphasised through their positioning within press releases 
(and see Guillamon-Saorin et al. 2012). Further, messages can be reinforced or diminished 
through using a keyword to accentuate (i.e. very) or understate (i.e. small) its significance.   
  
To this point our discussion has focused upon the nature and content of narrative disclosures, 
which are themselves complex (Beattie et al. 2004b), and to a lesser extent quantitative 
information (‘selectivity’ and ‘performance comparisons’), but annual reports also commonly 
include tables, photographs and graphs. Such visual effects can ‘activate readers’ and 
‘persuade them of the credibility of the reports’ (Stanton and Stanton 2002, p. 487). Despite 
this, and a call to examine the range of impression management devices used by management 
throughout the annual report as a whole (Davison 2002), it remains surprising that impression 
management research is largely narrative based. Studies investigating the use of photographs 
(Preston et al. 1996, Davison 2008, 2010) and graphs (Beattie and Jones 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 
Godfrey et al. 2003) have been, or could be, interpreted as further evidence of impression 
management. In particular the impression management of graphs within annual reports 
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through ‘selectivity’ and ‘measurement distortion’ is well established and has recently been 
found to also be evident in stand-alone sustainability reports (Jones 2011, Cho et al. 2012). 
There remain, however, very few studies that undertake a holistic review combining narrative 
and visual, despite the contemporary mixed presentation of annual reports (although Boiral 
2013 does so for sustainability reports using a different theoretical perspective). 
 
Our review of the literature suggests that there are two aspects (see Tedeschi and Melberg 
1984, Godfrey et al. 2003, Brennan et al. 2009) tactic and presentational method, to 
impression management within organisations’ reporting practice. We bring together the 
relevant literature within an impression management framework shown in Figure 1. Omission 
is shown as a defensive tactic, but demarcated by a separating line, as unlike all other tactics, 
it is not associated with presentational method.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The framework recognises the range of assertive and defensive tactics and the numerous 
associated visual and narrative methods that may be used in communication.  No prior study 
has considered such a wide array of impression management tactics and presentational 
methods, both narrative and visual. As a consequence less is known about how their use may 
be complementary and interrelated combining a number of tactics and presentational 
methods. This is important as it more fully conceptualises the complexities of corporate 
reporting practice, and any associated impression management (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 
2011), in a more ‘holistic manner, and not by merely using a single measure’ (Brennan et al. 
2009, p. 819).  
Prior impression management research examining extent to which impression management is 
related to a firm’s performance is limited, but there have been a small number of studies that 
present cross-sectional analysis of how differences in performance may influence reporting 
practice. There is some evidence to suggest that narrative and visual disclosures are different 
when strong financial or sustainability performers are contrasted with weaker performers 
(Clatworthy and Jones 2003, Hrasky 2012). More generally, the vast majority of empirical 
papers relevant to impression management in annual reports and sustainability reports have 
adopted a quantitative approach to consider impression management using cross-sectional 
data as can be seen from Table 2.  
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 Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Our review of the extant literature, therefore, suggests that there is a relative paucity of 
impression management studies drawing on longitudinal data from annual reports. The 
advantage of such longitudinal analysis is that evidence can be sought to examine if changes 
in reporting practice can be related to particular circumstances or characteristics. For 
instance, Neu et al. (1998, p. 277) assume that ‘environmental disclosures will vary over time 
in response to these pressures [from specific and general publics]’. Similarly, Samkin and 
Schneider (2010) examine how narrative disclosures change in response to stakeholder 
awareness of different issues that impacted upon their case organisation.  
 
Beattie and Jones (2000a), Beattie et al. (2008) and Godfrey et al. (2003) utilise longitudinal 
analyses to examine the impression management of financial graphs. Godfrey et al. (2003) 
specifically consider how a change in CEO may impact upon the selection of which financial 
graphs to report and their potential distortion. They find some evidence of ‘favourable 
impression management in the year after a CEO change’ (p. 95). Beattie et al. (2008) 
specifically found ‘continued evidence that financial graphs are used … for impression 
management purposes’ (p. 217) and moreover that the nature of the impression management 
had changed over time. For instance they found evidence that the ‘incidence of material 
distortion in key financial graphs has risen markedly’ from 1989 to 2004 (ibid.).  
 
Of most relevance to this paper are the three studies that examine how reporting practice may 
be related to changes in an individual firm's performance. Beattie and Jones (2000a) find 
‘strong evidence that the selective use of graphs … is related to corporate performance’ (p. 
224) and that ‘the direction of change in the performance indicator is of greater influence on 
the graph use decision than is the magnitude of change’ (p. 225). Courtis (2004) found 
evidence of reporting practice, specifically the use of colour within annual reports, changing 
but in this case the evidence was not ‘clear-cut’ as both companies with increasing 
profitability and companies with decreasing profitability were likely to have an increased 
application of colour in their annual reports. Finally, Aerts (2001) considered to what extent 
the ‘attributional content of the accounting narratives’ varied with firm characteristics, 
including changes in profitability. He observed ‘non-responsiveness … to overall 
10 
 
performance change’ (p. 29) and as such he found that there are ‘inertial forces’ that drive 
consistency in reporting practice.  
 
The majority of this research does appear to provide evidence that reporting practices are 
influenced by firm characteristics and circumstances, but the evidence with regard to the 
influence of firm performance and changes therein is scarce and mixed. Whilst Beattie and 
Jones (2000a) and Courtis (2004) do find evidence of some change in reporting practice when 
performance changed, Aerts (2001) found the disclosure of attributional statements to be 
relatively non-responsive. This paper aims to contribute to this literature by providing new 
evidence as to whether corporate reporting practice, consistent with impression management, 
changes depending upon company performance.  
 
Method 
The research method adopted in this study was designed to enable a longitudinal and 
comparative analysis of company reporting mapped against relative performance, in our case 
their regulatory leakage target. The longitudinal design enables the research to provide 
evidence of differential reporting, consistent with impression management, by companies 
between successive years of target attainment compared to target failure and with those 
companies that continually met their performance level across the period. The period of study 
was chosen to commence with a new regulatory pricing cycle from 2005-06 and was 
extended for a seven year period to 2011-12. Unlike many prior cross sectional studies, by 
adopting a longitudinal approach, the research ‘allows discretionary changes... by companies 
to be identified and related to changes in individual companies’ corporate performance’ 
(Beattie and Jones 2000a, p. 213, emphasis in original).  
To ensure a high level of coverage across the water sector, all WASCs were used in the 
study. Within England and Wales, WASC’s account for approximately 85% of the total water 
leakage targets (84.2% as at 2011-12 and 86.1% as at 2005-06), with much smaller water 
only companies making up the remaining 15%5. The annual reports for all WASCs and the 
Security of Supply reports, produced by OFWAT, were obtained for all years 2005-06 to 
2011-12. Leakage levels were initially obtained from the OFWAT Security of Supply reports, 
an independent reporting document, rather than the annual report. The necessity of this 
5 The average annual leakage target for a WASC is approximately 300Ml/d whereas for water only companies 
the average target is 44Ml/d. 
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approach was particularly evident in the event of failure to achieve the target level as in some 
instances neither the actual level nor the target were disclosed by the reporting WASC in 
their annual report for that year. For each WASC, for each of the seven years, the actual and 
target level of leakage was recorded and used to identify those years in which any WASC had 
failed to achieve its target level. WASC leakage performance against regulatory target in the 
seven year period, 2005-06 to 2011-12, is summarised in Table 3. From this, 13 instances of 
target failure are identified straddling two periods; firstly, 2006 and 2007; and, secondly 2010 
and 2011 with all WASCs achieving target leakage in the intervening years 2008 and 2009 
and again in 2012. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
For all instances of failure against target, company leakage reporting was compared against 
their disclosure in the tangential years of target attainment within the timeframe of the sample 
period and against OFWAT reporting of their leakage performance in the year of failure. 
Consistent with the aim of the paper, this approach allows us to identify possible impression 
management through differential patterns in disclosure relative to performance. Many past 
studies examining disclosure from an impression management perspective have solely 
focussed on the annual report (Neu et al. 1998, Clatworthy and Jones 2003, 2006, Courtis 
2004, Ogden and Clarke 2005, Davison 2008, Dhanani and Connolly 2012), or another single 
reporting document, for instance sustainability reports (Hrasky 2012) and press releases 
(Brennan et al. 2009) and have not sought to contrast this against a comparative account. 
There are a small number of studies (for instance Adams 2004, Boiral 2013) that have 
compared disclosure in annual reports or sustainability reports with external sources of data 
such as media reporting. However, in general such prior studies have been on a single year 
basis (see for instance Adams 2004, Mäkelä and Laine 2011, Chalmers et al. 2012, Boiral 
2013). Based on this comparative aspect of the research design, areas of potential reporting 
concealment or omission as two distinct impression management tactics can be more readily 
identified. Omission does not mean that there is no leakage reporting, but rather it is where an 
item of material, negative information is not present, such as no disclosure of leakage levels 
in comparison to disclosure in tangential years, whereas concealment is where such 
disclosure is present but in some way hidden through presentational methods such as page 
positioning, small print or obfuscation.  
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Water leakage forms part of voluntary disclosure made by WASCs in their annual reports, 
there is no statutory disclosure requirement. For voluntary disclosure, annual reports are 
widely used in accounting research for two reasons of pertinence to this study. Firstly, 
companies have editorial control over annual reports, and voluntary disclosure in particular, 
and as such these documents convey the reporting intent of management (Guthrie and Parker 
1989, Campbell 2000, Abeysekera 2008, Mäkelä and Laine 2011). Importantly for this 
research, Kent and Zunker, (2013) assert that the annual report represents ‘the voluntary 
information that management has selected to disclose’ (p. 1081). Secondly, from a 
longitudinal perspective, annual reports provide a consistent and robust source of data with 
regard to a company’s performance (Campbell 2000, Neimark 1995). This enables 
longitudinal analysis to provide insights into how reporting practice may change relative to 
performance. This would not be possible with other reporting mediums, for instance 
prospectuses (Bukh et al. 2005) which are one off documents or the use of websites 
(Striukova et al. 2008, Lee et al. 2007) that lack historic availability.  
For all years, for each WASC, all narrative and visual disclosure related to leakage was 
extracted from the Security of Supply reports and the annual reports. Thus there were seven 
Security of Supply reports with a total of 281 pages and 70 annual reports (ten WASCs over 
seven years). Within the annual report, all of the voluntary disclosure sections were examined 
up to the Director’s report and corporate governance statement. This typically included the 
cover page, highlights, chairman’s statement, chief executive review and performance review 
including corporate social responsibility. In total 1,985 pages of annual report information 
were examined.  
 
To identify the relevant leakage disclosure from the annual reports and the Security of Supply 
reports, a multi stage qualitative content analysis process (see Ogden and Clarke 2005, Boiral 
2013, Dhanani and Connolly 2015) was undertaken. The leakage disclosures identified 
include both text and visual effects and we agree that such ‘qualitative disclosures are best 
handled by qualitative methodologies’ (Rutherford 2003, pp. 206-7). Such qualitative studies 
are still relatively rare (see table 2), but this approach appears to be particularly valuable 
when visual images are to be examined (see for instance, Preston et al. 1996, Davison 2008, 
2010, 2011, Samkin and Schneider 2010, Boiral 2013).  
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Firstly, to identify leakage related disclosure of each annual report and to triangulate the data, 
the researchers developed a set of key words that would be used to search for relevant 
leakage disclosure:  leak(age); burst; spillage; lost; target and OFWAT. One WASC was used 
as a pilot and both of the researchers independently extracted and recorded, in a word 
document, leakage related narrative and visual disclosure (such as colour, use of bold or font 
size used in text or related graphics) for the seven year period. Other relevant visual images, 
such as photographs and tables, were identified as being those that related directly to leakage 
narrative reporting and had leakage data within them or included leakage in a caption (see 
Hrasky 2012, Boiral 2013), for instance a photograph of a leak inspector. The researchers 
then met to review the pilot data. In all instances there was agreement between the 
researchers on the recorded leakage disclosure. Based upon this pilot, all remaining reports 
were then examined and all narrative and visual leakage related disclosure extracted. This 
was replicated for the Security of Supply reports.  
 
Based on the qualitative content analysis dataset, the next stage was to tease out from the 
annual report based extracts, those passages and images most relevant to illustrate differential 
reporting, consistent with impression management, between years of target attainment and 
failure. This enabled the research to identify the relevant changes in reporting contrasting 
between years of target failure to target attainment. Other relevant instances of consistent 
reporting relevant to performance were also captured, as well as the disclosures provided by 
those WASCs that had continually attained their target. This was achieved through multiple 
close readings by each author whereby all of the material was read holistically rather than 
sectionalised as it may appear in an annual report. Close reading is a ‘forensic examination 
(of text) from a variety of perspectives’ (Amernic et al. 2010, p. vi) that permits researchers 
to scrutinise text for, inter alia, themes, patterns, and silences (and see Brennan et al. 2009, 
Craig and Amernic 2011). The final stage was to apply our framework by coding the relevant 
narrative and visual images identified to highlight differential reporting relative to 
performance. Using figure 1 and the related definitions (see table 1), each disclosure was 
categorised by the relevant assertive or defensive impression management tactic(s) and by its 
presentational format(s). This was performed by each researcher who then met to finalise the 
coding and resolve any differences. Due to the scale of examining the narrative and visual 
disclosures, photographs were noted where they are present/absent from the leakage reporting 
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but the photographs themselves are not analysed (see for instance Davison, 2008, 2010) 
through an impression management lens.  
Two issues arose during the coding process. Firstly, whilst some tactics were clearly 
identifiable by the definitions provided (such as omission, selectivity and performance 
comparison), others were more nuanced, such as those pertinent to self-promotion, 
entitlement and enhancement. A number of working examples were used to help differentiate 
between such tactics. Self-promotion emphasises management competence, for instance, 
‘playing a leading role in a review of leakage methodologies’ (Northumbrian 2009, p. 29); 
‘making Anglian Water an industry leader for 2011/12’ (Anglian 2012, p. 41). Entitlement, 
we see, as more specific in relation to discrete reporting outcomes, for instance, ‘We 
achieved our leakage target for the tenth year running (Yorkshire 2008, p.1); We have met 
our leakage targets (Severn Trent 2012, p. 5). Finally, enhancement can be seen to emphasise 
achievement despite negative external factors, for instance, ‘We met leakage target despite 
severe weather’ (Anglian 2010, p. 4); ‘successfully met annual leakage target in spite of 
coldest December in England in the last 100 years’ (Pennon 2011, p. 8). Consistent with the 
overall research design to help resolve any coding ambiguity and to provide internal 
reliability, disclosures were contrasted between successive years of target failure and 
attainment. We thus are able to present evidence, drawing on specific examples relevant to 
impression management, that are demonstrative of how WASCs change their reporting 
practice between those years of target failure and years of attainment. For instance in the case 
of omission, the presence or absence of leakage disclosure on target or actual performance 
between years of target attainment and failure. Some, but not all, disclosures may be omitted 
in years of failure compared to that disclosure provided in other years, whilst other 
disclosures that are provided may be consistent with other tactics of impression management 
such as concealment or selectivity. A similar comparative analysis applies to all other coding. 
Thus for entitlement and enhancement, we observe in years of target attainment, companies 
disclose their success with no reference to any favourable external factors (such as mild 
weather) or enhance their achievement of performance despite negative externalities. In direct 
contrast in tangential years of failure against target we observed the use of defensive tactics 
such as omission or excuse (such as the target failure being directly attributed to externalities 
such as poor weather). In light of this, we would argue that such a change in reporting to clear 
disclosure of target attainment for that year is consistent with entitlement as set out in table 1 
‘an organisation’s management claims responsibility for positive events and outcomes’. 
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Enhancement is identified in those instances where disclosures emphasise target attainment 
‘despite negative external influences’.  
 
Secondly, within the leakage reporting, a number of impression management tactics and 
presentational methods may be used together (i.e. they are not mutually exclusive) within the 
identified disclosures consistent with Figure 1. For instance we may observe tactics 
evidencing selectivity, performance comparison and self-promotion along with presentational 
methods of page positioning, repetition, font size and colour. All relevant tactics and 
presentational methods identified are noted in Tables 4 to 10. Thus, the findings that follow 
are multi-faceted with a range of defensive and assertive tactics used in years of target failure 
and attainment respectively mirroring company disclosure over the time period. The 
differential reporting observed in, and between, those periods is additionally contrasted with 
those WASCs that consistently met their targets in all years 2005-06 to 2011-12 shown in 
tables 6 and 10. Finally, we give specific consideration to that reporting, both narrative and 
visual, whilst relevant to leakage, does not change with regard to target achievement and 
hence is not consistent with impression management from a longitudinal perspective with 
regard to changes in performance.  
 
Our approach can best be described as a ‘close critical reading’ (Laine 2005) of the texts and 
we do not claim to have undertaken critical discourse analysis (Ferguson 2007). We accept 
that a limitation of our approach is that our conclusions are based on an analysis of the 
corporate and regulatory documents and that we do not provide evidence on how these 
documents are interpreted by their users and so ‘we concede the risk of the “fallacy of 
internalism” (Ferguson 2007)’ (Mäkelä and Laine 2011, p. 220). Our research design, both 
longitudinal and contrasting WASC and OFWAT disclosures, informs our interpretations, but 
we acknowledge that, due at least in part to space restrictions, we do not provide a fully 
comprehensive account of all leakage disclosures and, as is the case with much qualitative 
research, we accept that alternative interpretations could be reached. 
 
Findings 
By examining how reporting changes relative to performance between instances of target 
failure and target attainment a number of differential reporting practices are observed. This 
helps to provide evidence of impression management associated with changing performance 
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relative to a key performance metric at an individual company level and between companies 
operating in a common industry. Within the longitudinal period, the relevant OFWAT and 
WASC leakage reporting for all years of failure and adjoining years of target achievement are 
shown in Tables 4 and 5 (relevant to failures in 2006 and 2007) and Tables 7 to 9 (relevant to 
failures 2010 and 2011). To provide coherence, the findings have been purposively 
sectionalised by a number of identified key impression management tactics most relevant to 
the disclosures in the year of target failure. Whilst this approach provides a structure for the 
longitudinal analysis, we clearly recognise within each section the inherent overlaps relevant 
to other impression management tactics in that year, and in those cases of a second year of 
failure, that are referred to as appropriate. 
 
Omission of target failure  
In years of target failure, we observe examples of omission by WASCs relevant to their 
performance and/or their failure against target. This is contrasted with their disclosure in 
years in which they achieved the target, where we observe a marked shift in disclosure, and 
related presentation, to highlight their performance and target attainment. As discussed 
earlier, omission relates to elements of disclosure rather than a complete absence and hence 
will often be combined with other impression management tactics such as selectivity that are 
referred to and more fully addressed in the relevant section of the findings. 
 
 In 2006, Thames and United Utilities failed against their regulatory leakage target. There 
was no disclosure provided by either of the companies of their failure against their respective 
targets, nor any data on OFWAT target levels (annual average Ml/d) and their performance 
against these (see table 4). Whilst not disclosing target failure, United Utilities prominently 
states that ‘it is pleased with progress on important areas such as leakage’ (p. 2) indicative of 
self-promotion and further, using a historical perspective that it has ‘halved water leakage 
since 1995’ (selectivity and performance comparison, see later). The lack of disclosure on 
leakage performance against target is perhaps surprising mindful of the strength of the 
disclosure provided by OFWAT in their reporting of the target failures as shown in table 4. In 
contrast, in 2007 when the target was met, both companies disclosed their prior year failure: 
‘The failure to meet the 2005/06 leakage target’ (Thames 2007, p. 9); and ‘met the economic 
level of leakage rolling target...for the first time in five years’ (United Utilities 2007, p. 28). 
The disclosure in 2007 makes clear their achievement of the target consistent with 
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performance comparison, entitlement and self-referencing: Thames ‘we met the required 
target for 2006-07 by a considerable margin’ (p. 10); and, United Utilities ‘we out-performed 
the rolling average leakage target’ (p. 35). Within these disclosures we see evidence of 
reinforcement (‘considerable margin’; ‘out-performed’) and each company further 
emphasises its achievements by repeating the disclosure of target achievement three and four 
times respectively. In terms of presentational format, Thames displayed a table of 
performance against target in 2007; no performance data was given in 2006. United Utilities 
highlighted their target attainment with a blue water bubble graphic as part of the chief 
executive’s report: ‘we have achieved our economic level of leakage rolling target’ (p. 6). 
Further to this immediate change in reporting in 2007, in all of the years that follow from 
2007 to 2012 both companies clearly report their target achievement. Thames consistently 
and prominently discloses their leakage target achievement. For instance, ‘the Company has 
achieved its leakage target for the sixth successive year, and by a significant margin’ 
(Thames 2012, Chairman’s Statement, p. 4). A similar pattern of subsequent annual 
disclosure, absent in the year of failure, is also provided by United Utilities, with prominence 
of current year and historic target achievement: ‘met our regulatory leakage target for the 
sixth consecutive year’ (United Utilities 2012, Financial Highlights, p. 1).  
 
Severn Trent failed to achieve target in both 2006 and 2007 (see table 5). The leakage related 
disclosure found on page 17, in 2006 implies that leakage target has not been met, ‘by the end 
of the AMP4 period, we can reduce our leakage figures to below the target level set by 
Ofwat’ (Performance Review, p. 17). However, unlike later years of target attainment, there 
is no explicit disclosure with regard to the current year target failure or any data on leakage 
target levels, consistent with omission. Further, the page location of the narrative only 
disclosure that is provided is consistent with concealment (see later). In contrast, in 2008 
when the target was attained full and prominent disclosure is provided on the inside front 
cover of the annual report. The 2008 performance is visually emphasised to readers in blue 
bold graphics: ‘Delivering results: outperformed against leakage target’ (entitlement, 
performance comparison; reinforcement). A further graphic on KPI highlights reinforces the 
outperformance against target (p. 10). The performance against target was repeated a further 
twice. In the subsequent year of target attainment, 2009 (‘outperforming our leakage target’, 
p. 1), there is equally prominent disclosure of success again visually emphasised through 
large font and bullet. In 2007, the second year of target failure, there is disclosure of target 
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failure (p. 7) although continued omission of the ongoing regulatory action by OFWAT and 
omission of the target level matched to performance unlike that disclosed in subsequent 
years. However, the disclosure is more prominently positioned within the chief executive’s 
report (p. 7) emphasising the year on year improvement in leakage (performance 
comparison). This increased prominence and level of disclosure in the second year of failure 
may indicate a further change in reporting practice. Impression management tactics, such as 
concealment or omission, may be employed to mask, or remain silent on, short term issues 
(Merkl-Davis and Brennan 2007), but companies may disclose more in a subsequent year of 
failure as its leakage performance arguably becomes more apparent as an issue to the 
regulator and stakeholders. Moreover, the company may, in the second year, be able to 
report, positively, a reduction in year on year leakage, compared to the first year of failure as 
detailed above. The increased disclosure in the second year of failure, especially in cases 
where failure against target is now also disclosed serves to provide a more balanced account 
and parallels that observed in the earnings management literature (see for instance Kuang et 
al. 2014, Marinovic 2014 Scott 2012) where over the longer term, short term bias in reporting 
is not sustainable. 
Whilst omission was a common feature in the first period of target failures, there is less 
evidence regarding omission in the later period, although, as seen in the following sections 
below, there is common use of other defensive tactics. In respect of Yorkshire for 2010, there 
is omission of target and performance and their failure to meet the target for that year (see 
table 8). Instead the disclosure states that ‘our aim is to...outperform our targets’ and to be 
‘OFWAT’s frontier company’ (p. 6) (self-promotion). No leakage data or consideration of 
target failure is disclosed. Prior to the failure, in 2008, Yorkshire prominently reported ‘We 
achieved our leakage target for the tenth year running’ (p. 1) (performance comparison, 
entitlement and self-referencing) repeated a further twice and reinforced against the target 
level of leakage. In 2009, leakage is reported in the Business Review showing the actual and 
target data: ‘turning out at 295Ml/d and we out-performed our regulatory target of 297.1Ml/d’ 
(p. 5) again providing readers of the annual report with clear and unambiguous information 
on their attainment of target. Following their return to target attainment in 2012, the 
disclosure reverts to their explicit and prominent disclosure of leakage performance and their 
target attainment, which is repeated and reinforced in the disclosure provided. For instance, 
‘comfortably over achieve the leakage target of 297 Ml/d and achieve the lowest ever levels’ 
(p. 4) reinforced through the use of a table, notably not used in prior years of failure, showing 
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actual, prior year and target levels for leakage. In common with the multiple failure of Severn 
Trent, in the second year of failure (2011), increased disclosure relevant to target, is provided 
by Yorkshire (see table 8). This will be further discussed in the context of concealment and 
excuse and justification, nonetheless it is again indicative of a pattern of an increased level 
reporting with respect to performance in the second year of target failure.  
 
Concealment of target failure  
Due to the research approach adopted, we are able to specify concealment as a distinct 
defensive impression management tactic compared to omission. We find evidence of 
concealment in failed years compared to the disclosure in tangential years of target 
attainment.  Whilst omission was a common feature in the first period of target failure, 
concealment appears to be more common, as a differential reporting practice consistent with 
impression management, in respect of the later period.  
 
For Anglian, in 2010 (see table 9), there is prominent and unambiguous disclosure of target 
attainment, ‘for the ninth year in succession, we have once again met our demanding targets 
on reducing leakage’ (Managing Director’s Statement, p. 6). In direct contrast, in 2011, the 
disclosure of performance against target shifts to page 29, indicative of concealment, 
although readers are prominently told that, ‘our leakage rates are consistently almost half the 
industry average’ (p. 4) (performance comparison; self-promotion). This comparison is also 
emphasised by a colour graphic showing the industry average (in the year of failure), not 
shown as a colour graphic in the preceding year of target attainment. The disclosure in 2011, 
against the industry average, is later repeated along with the statement claiming ‘we have met 
our leakage targets for the last eight years’ (p. 29) (entitlement). Such a claim is perhaps 
surprising given the failure to meet the target in the current year and the disclosure in the 
prior year (2010) that targets had been achieved for the ninth successive year as quoted 
above. For 2012, target attainment is again prominently conveyed to readers on the inside 
front cover visually reinforced through a graphic, the narrative of which is repeated on page 2 
‘beating our leakage target by over 6%’, (entitlement) and subsequently repeated a further 
four times. The industry positioning now conveys Anglian’s status as ‘an industry leader for 
2011/12’ (self-promotion) compared to the graphic against average industry leakage rates 
used in 2011. 
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As noted earlier, there was omission by Yorkshire in 2010 of its failure to meet target with no 
disclosure of actual leakage levels or any leakage target figure. In contrast, in the second year 
of failure, 2011, greater disclosure on performance is provided showing actual leakage levels 
of 325 Ml/d. However, the failure against target is concealed, as it is not clearly presented, 
(consistent with obfuscation), in the reporting within the section entitled: ‘100% compliance’. 
Within that section, they report a target figure as follows: ‘with a view to reducing leakage to 
297 Ml/d’ (p. 7). Hence, despite the claim of 100% compliance the target has not been met. 
Further, whilst that is the target for the year (extracted from Security of Supply data), this 
detail, is unknown to readers from the annual report but could be inferred due to the 
references to OFWAT in the ‘100% compliance’ section. In contrast, in 2012, when the target 
is again met there is clear reporting of the target level ‘achieve our leakage target of 297 
Ml/d’ and the use of a table prominently displayed within the Business Review (p. 4) 
showing performance against target, not used in either year of target failure. The leakage 
performance is also prominently reported on page 1 in the Chairman’s Review in 2012.   
 
For Northumbrian, in all years 2006 to 2009, leakage target attainment is clearly disclosed 
using a single measure of leakage. In 2010, a year of target failure, the leakage reporting is 
concealed (consistent with obfuscation) through the use of two performance measures, annual 
and three year rolling targets, rather than the single measure used in all prior reports. Success 
against the three year rolling target is however attributable to the two prior years of target 
attainment (in 2008 and 2009) and thus less reflective of current year performance. In the 
second year of failure, 2011, we again observe increased narrative disclosure (see table 8) 
consistent with that seen in relation to Severn Trent and Yorkshire. The disclosure 
emphasises the weather as a causal factor (discussed further below), pays tribute to the efforts 
of employees in trying to control leakage, and notably their failure to achieve target, ‘the 
severe freeze….as a result, we, along with other companies, did not meet our annual leakage 
target’ (p. 39). Whilst Northumbrian disclose their failure to achieve target in each of the 
years 2010 and 2011, it is noteworthy that leakage data is shown in tabular form in 2012 
(page 7), the next year of target attainment. In that year, success against target is clearly 
emphasised in the disclosure ‘we met our target comfortably’ (p. 18) with, and unlike the two 
prior years of failure, no reference to the weather as a causal factor nor reference to the 
performance of other companies in the industry 
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Finally, for Southern (see table 8), in all years prior to 2010, and subsequently in 2012, there 
is clear disclosure of target attainment, for instance ‘we recorded our lowest figure ever and 
beat the current target set by our regulator OFWAT by 11 Ml/d’ (2012, p.3). For 2010, the 
failure against target is obfuscated. The actual performance is reported in a table comparing 
current and prior year leakage levels and the target for next year. The target for the current 
year is reported separately in the narrative stating ‘its aim is to beat annual leakage targets set 
by Ofwat (92 Ml/d for 2009-10) maintaining its position as the water and sewerage company 
with the lowest leakage levels in the industry, measured on a per property basis’ (2010, p.4), 
emphasising its performance in the sector (selectivity and performance comparison), rather 
than its failure, in that year, to meet the target. In the following year, 2011, and common with 
other examples of consecutive failures against target, Southern provides disclosure of its 
target failure, ‘we have not met this target’ (2011, p. 6), although this was attributed to the 
weather (see excuse, justification and enhancement section later).  
 
Selectivity of performance measurement 
In addition to omission and concealment of target failure, there is evidence of selectivity and 
specific performance comparisons of data that changes between years of target failure and 
attainment. United Utilities failed to achieve target in 2006. It prominently reported a 
reduction in spot leakage (see table 4) and hence favourable comparison to prior year. The 
performance was emphasised by the use of a colour graphic. OFWAT leakage targets are 
based on annual average leakage levels. The selective use of data also enabled the company 
to report that: ‘met its spot target of 470 Ml per day at the end of 2005/06’ (p. 30) 
(entitlement) although, omitting its failure against the target measure of leakage used by 
OFWAT. In the following year, 2007, a year of target achievement, reporting of leakage was 
based on the standard performance metric of annual average leakage. The performance is 
again emphasised through a colour graphic and reporting is reinforced and directly compared 
to the target level ‘out-performed the rolling average target of 470 Ml per day for 2006/07 by 
achieving 468 Ml per day, meeting our agreed target with Ofwat’ (p. 35) repeated and 
emphasised by visual and narrative disclosure of leakage on pages 2, 5 and 6 of the report. 
Additionally in 2007, the KPI table reports leakage based on annual average compared to the 
prior year, which is restated in annual average data rather than the previously used spot data. 
Leakage was not included in the KPI table in 2006. In all subsequent years of target 
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attainment, leakage against target is prominently and consistently displayed in KPI tables 
using annual average data. 
 
A similar pattern of selectivity with regard to leakage measurement is also observed for 
Severn Trent in respect of its increased disclosure in 2007, the second year of failure, (see 
table 5) after omission of target and actual performance in 2006. Two selective measures are 
used to portray performance in 2007, namely that ‘we attained a monthly level of leakage 
commensurate with the OFWAT annual target’ (p. 7) (entitlement) and a performance 
comparison of prior year performance ‘our leakage increased in the prior year’. Additionally, 
for 2007, a selective leakage measure, DMA (district metered areas), is shown within a KPI 
table. In 2008, a year of target attainment, the leakage data used in the KPI table is based on 
annual average leakage with the data for 2007 restated.  In subsequent years (2009 and 2010) 
tabulated leakage information is similarly reported on an annual average basis and with 
comparisons against target provided in the narrative.  
 
In 2011, Severn Trent failed against its target (see table 7). Compared to the prior failures, in 
2006 and 2007, there is again increased disclosure and narrative regarding their failure to 
achieve target (p.7).  The visual emphasis of leakage, consistent with selectivity and 
performance comparison, is against prior year data with a large colour graphic of comparative 
performance shown as part of the Business Review on page 12. This enables the company to 
focus on its maintenance of leakage levels compared to a prior period rather than, as in 
previous years of success against target levels. In contrast to the 2011 historic comparison, in 
the following year, 2012, colour graphics are used to report in detail directly against OFWAT 
target ‘have beaten our OFWAT target of 474 Ml/d by 10 Ml/d’ (p. 15), the success of which 
is repeated six times through the report. 
 
Whilst Dŵr Cymru provided consistent narrative on leakage performance success and failure 
across 2010 to 2012 (see table 9), nonetheless there was evidence of differential reporting 
with regard to its visual presentation of performance, and against target, in the year of failure, 
2011.  In that year, a graph showing leakage was used for the first time that highlighted the 
fall in annual leakage for the ten year period from 2001/2 to 2010/11. This was scaled to 
show the ten year downward trend in leakage rather than highlight the rise in leakage in 
2010/11 which was confined to the narrative. In the following year of target attainment, the 
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graph was rescaled, an example of measurement distortion (see Beattie et al. 2008), to show 
more clearly the fall in leakage in 2012 and the rise in leakage that occurred in 2011. There 
was a similar shift in presentational format of the performance comparison against target with 
respect to KPI reporting of water leakage. In 2011, the KPI table reported performance 
against prior year. For both the preceding year (2010) and subsequent year (2012) of target 
attainment, the KPI table includes target information, emphasised in 2012 by the use of a 
green tick to visually show target achievement. 
 
Excuse, justification and enhancement relevant to performance 
The weather as an external factor is commonly used by all WASCs to attribute failure against 
target, through excuse and justification, or conversely to enhance their target achievement. 
However, whilst this is a notable feature of their disclosure in bad weather conditions 
(freeze/thaw winter cycles) it is not present as an influencing factor in mild weather 
conditions.  
 
In 2007-08 OFWAT reported: ‘favourable weather conditions in 2007-08. The relatively mild 
conditions reduced significantly the number of bursts caused when the ground around water 
pipes freezes and thaws’ (p. 23). Across all of the WASCs there is no attribution of 
performance to the mild weather. The disclosure by all WASCs reflects their good 
management of leakage in that year through self-referencing and consistent with entitlement. 
For instance, Severn Trent, ‘we have outperformed our Ofwat target for 2007/08’ (p. 6) and 
Yorkshire, ‘we achieved our leakage target’ (p. 1). In contrast all WASCs who failed their 
targets in 2010 and 2011, where disclosure is given, directly attribute their failure to the 
weather conditions (see tables 8 and 9). For instance, Yorkshire refer to ‘the cold weather of 
2010/11 turning out to be even worse than the previous year’ and Northumbrian directly 
attribute their performance in both 2010 and 2011 to the ‘severe freeze’ and ‘worst winter in 
over 100 years’ respectively. Northumbrian’s disclosure in both years also highlights that 
other WASCs had equally failed their target serving to diminish their own failure as a sector 
wide rather than company specific issue. In 2010, only two other WASCs failed against 
target. The direct attribution of target failure to the weather is further illustrated by Southern, 
‘as a result [of the harsh winter] we have been unable to achieve the challenging leakage 
targets that we set for ourselves’ (2011, p. 4). Severn Trent similarly attributed their failure to 
the weather: ‘Leakage was above target as a result of the severe winter weather’ (2011, p. 5) 
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and for the first time in any disclosure used a visual to graph the winter peaks of leakage (p. 
12). The weather was not mentioned as a contributory factor for target attainment in 2012. 
 
However, it is not only those WASCs that failed their targets that make use of the weather as 
part of leakage disclosure. Bad weather is also used by those companies who met targets to 
enhance their levels of performance. For instance in 2010, Anglian reported, ‘we met leakage 
target despite severe weather’ (p. 4) and Dŵr Cymru similarly, ‘we again achieved 
OFWAT’s leakage reduction target despite...the freezing weather at the start of 2010’ (p. 2). 
Again, there is no mention of the mild weather in other years of target attainment. 
 
Cross-sectional evidence 
We now turn to briefly contrast the differential disclosure observed in respect of target 
failures with that disclosure provided by those WASCs, Pennon and Wessex, that attained 
their target in all years across the period studied. In 2006 and 2007, three WASCs did not 
meet their OFWAT leakage targets in one or both of the years. We have presented evidence 
of omission, concealment and selectivity of their performance and reporting on their failure 
against the OFWAT targets in those years compared to their prominent and unambiguous 
reporting in subsequent years of target attainment. In contrast, the companies that met their 
leakage targets across the period, 2006 to 2008, provide consistent reporting of their leakage 
performance against the OFWAT target with little variation in the disclosure as shown in 
table 6. However, in the second period of multiple target failures, 2010 and 2011, there are 
some shifts in their disclosure to highlight their performance relative to other WASCs (see 
table 10). Notably in 2011, when six of the ten WASCs failed against target, and in contrast 
to all preceding years, there is a significant increase in visual effects used in reporting to 
emphasise the ‘industry leading performance’ (inside front cover and repeated p. 8) of 
Pennon in ‘successfully meeting leakage target’. All visuals are colour; large font and 
prominently shown commencing on the inside cover and repeated in the Business Review. A 
similar prominence of industry positioning is also shown by Wessex in 2011 who report, ‘We 
remain one of the most efficient and profitable of all water and sewerage companies, with the 
highest levels of service in the industry...we not only cut leakage but also met a challenging 
new target’ (p. 4). This provides some initial, albeit anecdotal evidence, that companies 
change their reporting practice to highlight their superior performance relative to others. 
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Unchanged reporting practice 
Finally, we find elements of disclosure that could be demonstrative of impression 
management when compared cross-sectionally, are not subject to differential reporting when 
specifically mapped against target success and failure6. For instance, disclosure pertinent to 
levels of investment in leakage and leakage repair rates provided by some WASCs, 
conveying a positive message to readers arguably consistent with impression management, is 
found in years of target failure. However similar disclosure is also provided in subsequent 
years of attainment. Thus the reporting practice does not alter with performance. The 
following extracts relevant to these issues provide illustrative disclosure in years of target 
failure: 
We are spending on average more than £500,000 per day on this and are fixing an average of 
200 leaks a day. We have more than 1,000 people working on our ambitious project to replace 
our oldest and leakiest mains in London. In the calendar year 2005 we accelerated this work 
and replaced over 150 km of the oldest water mains in London. (Thames 2006, pp. 3-4). 
 
We employed more people, invested in new leak detection technology, fixed 37,000 leaks, 
8,000 more than the previous year (Severn Trent, 2007 p. 6). 
 
In the following year of target attainment, the disclosure regarding investment in leakage and 
repair rates as ongoing issues remains broadly constant, and unlike prior findings of 
differential reporting, do not significantly change with their performance against the key 
measurable. 
Continuing with Victorian Mains Replacement ("VMR") to tackle legacy issues associated 
with security of supply and leakage...The Company’s VMR programme will provide the 
majority of the reduction in leakage as old pipes are replaced by new in the leakiest parts of 
London...Over the five years to 2010 the Company intends to invest more than £500,000 a 
day to reduce leakage: a total of around £1.15 billion. (Thames 2007, p. 14). 
 
In 2007/08, we found and fixed over 39,000 leaks, compared with 37,000 in 2006/07 (Severn 
Trent 2008, p. 16). 
 
In relation to visual effects for the presentation and emphasis of disclosure, we have seen 
differential reporting practice with respect to tables and graphics. A further powerful source 
of visual emphasis, is the use of photographs. Whilst we restrict our findings to the presence 
of photographs, there are instances of photographs showing leakage related matters, 
particularly in relation to employees, such as leak inspection teams (Wessex 2011, p.20); leak 
employee profiles (Anglian 2012, p. 74; Severn Trent 2012, p15) and network upgrade 
6 We are thankful to one of the reviewers for referring to the power of longitudinal research design. This helps to 
separate continuous reporting of an issue compared to differential reporting that is more consistent with 
impression management. 
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(United Utilities 2008, p. 20). However, we find that the use of photographs is not related to 
changes in performance in this instance7. Rather, photographs appear as more variable 
elements of reporting across all of the WASCs and throughout the longitudinal period.  
 
Discussion and concluding comments 
Our findings section reported our qualitative analysis of the ten WASCs annual report 
leakage disclosures over the seven year period 2005/6 – 2011/12 mapped against their 
performance and with OFWAT’s own commentary. This section discusses the key themes 
that emerge from our analysis and concludes our paper by recognising its limitations as well 
as outlining areas for future research. 
Firstly, we return to Brennan et al.’s (2009) ‘central question’ to provide evidence that 
reporting practices do vary with firm performance. In contrast to earlier studies (Yuthas et al. 
2002, Clatworthy and Jones 2003, Hrasky 2012), which consider how disclosures vary across 
companies according to overall financial or sustainability performance, our longitudinal 
analysis provides insights into how reporting practice changes relative to performance. It 
considers leakage disclosures with regard to leakage performance, an important strategic and 
stakeholder issue for the WASCs. From the seventy firm years we analysed, there were 
thirteen instances where a WASC failed to meet their leakage targets (a measure of poor 
performance). We provide evidence that in such instances the level, nature and presentation 
of leakage disclosure was, in general, markedly different, and consistent with impression 
management, as compared with the years in which the same WASC did successfully meet 
their target (as a counter measure of good performance).  
The second challenge to which our research responded was to adopt a more holistic approach 
to examining impression management. Prior studies have tended to take a more narrow focus 
on specific aspects. To help with this, we developed a framework drawn from the underlying 
literature that sets out impression management tactics and presentational method. We find 
that impression management tactics are not mutually exclusive, but rather multiple tactics are 
commonly found to be used in conjunction with each other. Similarly numerous 
presentational methods are often employed together and moreover our evidence suggests that 
there is a mosaic of impression management tactics and presentational method in relevant 
7 We are thankful to one of the reviewers for highlighting the use of photographs in comparison to other visual 
effects used by WASCs in their leakage related disclosure. 
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leakage disclosures. We do, therefore, find that impression management is a multi-faceted 
and complex practice (Ogden and Clarke 2005, Brennan et al. 2009). Whilst we find that 
some impression management tactics are commonly used in the examined reporting, others 
such as apology and restitution do not feature. It is possible that particular issues may, due to 
their inherent nature, lend themselves more readily to the use of certain defensive 
tactics.  Omission, concealment or excuse and justification may be often used defensive 
tactics for leakage reporting, but perhaps apology and restitution may be more 
appropriate for disclosures relating to pollution and sewerage incidents that more directly 
impact on the environment with wider public health issues.   
Of those tactics that were more evident in the examined disclosures, we find that WASCs 
commonly omitted to report, or concealed their failure against the OFWAT target despite its 
importance to stakeholders (Hopkinson et al. 2000, Defra 2008, Consumer Council 2013). 
Concealment was through the location of the disclosures in less prominent sections of the 
report, or obfuscation in the reporting, with much less, or indeed no, use of visual effects. In 
these years, the vast majority of reporting was in the form of narrative disclosure. In contrast, 
these same WASCs did prominently, clearly and repeatedly disclose their success in meeting 
the target in years of success. Whilst the absence of accounting (Choudhury 1998, Catasús 
2008) and absence of reporting (Belal and Cooper 2011, Boiral 2013) have been identified in 
the wider accounting literature it has tended to be conflated with concealment in previous 
studies that have drawn upon impression management (Ogden and Clarke 2005, Dhanani and 
Connolly 2012). Our evidence suggests that omission should be explicitly recognised as an 
identifiable impression management tactic which is distinct from concealment.  
Other marked changes in reporting practice, indicative of impression management included 
evidence of selectivity, performance comparison and excuse/justification. For failed years, a 
WASC may select a different measure of leakage and change the benchmark to which this 
performance was compared and highlighted. Usually this was a comparison to prior year 
performance rather than the leakage target that was routinely emphasised in years of target 
attainment. In instances where the WASC did admit to failing to meet their leakage target the 
disclosures refer to the weather to as an external factor, which is outside management’s 
control, and that contributed to the failed performance. Conversely, there was never any 
reference to ‘mild’ weather being a factor in years of target attainment.  
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Another notable feature of the disclosure is that in successful years WASCs would make 
much greater use visual effects complementary to the prominent and repeated narrative 
disclosure concerning target performance. There was a much higher incidence of graphics 
(often a water bubble or water drop) and detailed tables (showing actual and target data), as 
well as more visible presentational style through colour, font size, bold text and bullet points. 
The visual, in all its forms, is a particularly powerful medium for communication (Davison 
2008, Campbell et al. 2009) and our findings provide further evidence that companies 
manage impressions through the ‘expressive power of the visual’ (Dhanani and Connolly 
2012). The narrative tone in such years would be assertive, commonly showing evidence of 
entitlement, self-referencing, repetition, reinforcement, in emphasising target attainment. 
There were also a small number of examples where a WASC failed against their leakage 
target for more than one year. Our evidence tentatively suggests that in a subsequent year of 
failure there is a further shift in disclosure. In general, we found less evidence of omission 
and concealment and greater clarity and prominence of reporting with respect to target failure 
in such instances. We note that it is well documented that the manipulation of earnings must 
reverse over time (Kuang et al. 2014, Marinovic 2014) and so is a short-term tactic that will 
be revealed over multiple accounting periods (Scott 2012). Effectively, over time managers 
will ‘run out of ways to manage earnings’ (Perols and Lougee 2011, p. 39) as they ‘cannot 
indefinitely postpone the day of reckoning’ (Scott 2012, p. 424). Similarly, the employment 
of impression management tactics has the potential to convey more favourable reporting to 
users who arguably ‘are unable to assess managerial bias in the short term’ (Merkl-Davis and 
Brennan 2007, p. 119). However such an impression may be more difficult to sustain in the 
longer run as the underlying poor performance becomes more apparent. 
Due to the longitudinal research approach we are also able to identify those elements of 
disclosure, that remained either relatively constant when performance changed or had no 
discernible reporting pattern. For instance, disclosure relating to investment in leakage, whilst 
positive, did not vary with performance and hence is not consistent with impression 
management with regard to performance. Thus in considering research design, establishing 
the (in)consistency as well as tone of disclosure is an important consideration. Further, whilst 
leakage related photographs are included in annual reports, there does not seem to be 
evidence as to their use in support of conveying an impression to readers.  
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Whilst recognising that not all disclosure is subject to manipulation, nonetheless our evidence 
suggests that the ‘discretionary disclosure choices’ referred to by Merkl-Davis and Brennan 
(2007, p. 117) are exhibited with reporting practices changing relative to performance. This is 
contrary to the consistent use of attributional statements that Aerts (2001) suggested was due 
to ‘inertial forces’. Rather, our findings resonate with the more narrowly focussed studies of 
Beattie and Jones (2000a) and Courtis (2004), which found, respectively, that the use of 
graphs and colour changed with performance.  
 
Whilst we accept that our study suffers from the ‘limitation of cross-sectional narrowness’ 
(Campbell and Rahman 2010, p. 57), importantly, we are able to illustrate the changes in 
reporting with performance and the complementary and inter-related nature of impression 
management. Such changes in reporting practice relative to performance are unlikely to be 
unique to this industry and concerns, with implications for corporate reporting practice more 
widely, have already been raised (ICAS 2013, ICAEW 2013). The omission or concealment 
of poor performance, and the evident selectivity of measurement bases and related visual 
emphasis used by the companies across the years of the study run counter to the notion of 
providing a trustworthy and balanced account of their performance to stakeholders (Crowther 
et al. 2006, IASB 2010, ICAEW 2013). The dangers of such a constructed reality referred to 
by Hines (1988) conveyed by managers in the annual report led Merkl-Davies et al. (2011, p. 
317) to assert that impression management ‘constitutes an important governance and 
regulatory issue’.   
 
From a practice perspective, ICAS (2013, p. 6) asserted that the voluntary disclosures 
forming part of the annual report should ‘not be subject to ‘spin’ or ‘bias’ – in particular to 
avoid the situation where the directors ‘cherry pick’ the information reported/provided and 
focus on promoting mainly the positive aspects of the company’s performance’. The IASB’s 
practice statement (2010, p. 15) suggests that management should consistently report 
performance measures within their management commentaries that ‘reflect the critical 
success factors of an entity’ and are ‘accepted and widely used … within an industry’ to 
enable comparability across companies and over time. The practice statement specifically 
states that when ‘management changes the performance measures and indicators used, the 
changes should be identified and explained’ (p. 15). Despite such guidance, our evidence is 
that in times of poor performance, changes were made to the selection of performance 
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measures and their comparators and that this was not identified or explained. We therefore 
believe that the guidance on narrative reporting, and in particular performance metrics, 
should be reconsidered to reduce the discretionary reporting choices evident within annual 
reports. Further, the IASB’s practice statement says very little about the use of visual effects, 
which our evidence suggests is an important part of disclosure and impression management. 
We also recommend, therefore, that the IASB should provide guidance as to the need for 
neutral and consistent use of visual effects, such as graphics, tables and graphs within 
corporate reporting practice.  
 
Our qualitative analysis was undertaken in a particular empirical setting, which was 
particularly useful in enabling the WASCs’ leakage disclosures to be contrasted with 
OFWAT’s counter account. Our study does not provide any evidence as to whether narrative 
disclosures are the result of conscious or unconscious decisions making (Clatworthy and 
Jones 2006, Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007) nor has it attempted to provide evidence on 
how these documents are interpreted by their users (Ferguson 2007). We recognise these as 
limitations of our study.  Direct engagement with users, company management and the 
regulator in respect of the observed disclosures and impression management therein would 
also be a valuable extension for the research. Finally, we call for future impression 
management studies to analyse company specific longitudinal data so that further instances 
of, and reasons for, discretionary changes in reporting practice can be identified. Employing 
the framework developed in this research, may enable further comment on whether 
commonly used impression management tactics and presentational method change reflective 
of company or sector specific circumstances either within public utilities or in wider sectors 
of the economy.  
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Figure 1: A framework for impression management 
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Table 1: Definitions of Impression Management Tactics. 
TACTIC Definition Sources 
Assertive   
Ingratiation 
      
 
An organisation’s management seeks to gain the audience’s approbation by 
praising and flattering them or by expressing similar beliefs, values and 
attitudes. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984), Ogden and Clarke 
(2005). 
 
Self-promotion An organisation’s management promotes their own competence, qualities, 
abilities and experience. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984), Arndt and Bigelow 
(2000). 
Exemplification An organisation’s management seeks to be perceived as morally virtuous 
and conforming to principled ideals and conduct. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984), Ogden and Clarke 
(2005). 
Entitlement An organisation’s management claims responsibility for positive events 
and outcomes. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984), Aerts (2005), Brennan 
et al. (2009). 
Enhancement An organisation’s management claims that the value of a positive event is 
greater than thought and/or achieved despite negative external influences. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984), Aerts (2005). 
Assertive or Defensive   
Selectivity An organisation’s management selects performance numbers to portray it 
in the best possible light. 
Godfrey et al. (2003), Brennan et al. (2009). 
Performance comparisons An organisation’s management select benchmarks that portray current 
performance favourably. 
Brennan et al. (2009). 
Defensive   
Dis(as)sociation An organisation’s management distances itself from events with negative 
implications often by initiating change in personnel. 
Ogden and Clarke (2005), Samkin and Schneider 
(2010). 
Excuses An organisation’s management denies responsibility for an event with 
negative implications by blaming external factors beyond their control. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984), Benoit (1995), Arndt 
and Bigelow (2000), Ogden and Clarke (2005), 
Brennan et al. (2009). 
Justifications An organisation’s management accepts at least partial responsibility for an 
event, but does not accept the attribution of any negative implications. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984), Ogden and Clarke 
(2005), Brennan et al. (2009). 
Apologies An organisation’s management accepts at least partial responsibility for an 
event with negative implications and expresses some remorse. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984), Benoit, 1995, Ogden 
and Clarke (2005). 
Restitution An organisation’s management compensates a victim to avoid any 
appearance of injustice or unfairness which lead to negative impressions. 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984). 
Concealment An organisation’s management obfuscates or downplays negative 
information by giving it less prominence. 
Brennan et al. (2009), Merkl-Davies et al. (2011), 
Dhanani and Connolly (2012). 
Omission An organisation’s management withhold negative information. Adams (2004), Belal and Cooper (2011), Boiral (2013) 
 
Table 2: Empirical studies of Impression Management in Annual Reports and Sustainability Reports 
Author and year Research method Sample Longitudinal data? Content analysed 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) Quantitative  US listed companies’ President’s letters No - cross sectional Text 
Aerts (1994) Quantitative Belgian companies’ annual reports No - cross sectional Attributional statements 
Aerts (2001) Quantitative  Belgian companies’ annual reports Yes  Attributional statements 
Aerts (2005) Quantitative  Belgian companies’ annual reports No – cross sectional Attributional statements 
Arndt and Bigelow (2000) Qualitative US hospitals’ annual reports No – cross sectional Text  
Beattie and Jones (2000a) Quantitative  UK listed companies’ annual reports Yes  Graphs 
Beattie and Jones (2002) Quantitative  Company annual reports from 6 countries No – cross sectional Graphs 
Beattie et al. (2008) Quantitative UK listed companies’ annual reports Yes Graphs and structure of annual reports 
Cho et al. (2012) Quantitative  US companies’ sustainability reports No – cross sectional Graphs 
Clatworthy and Jones (2001) Quantitative  UK listed companies’ chairman’s 
statements 
No – cross sectional Text - readability 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) Quantitative  UK listed companies’ chairman’s 
statements 
No – cross sectional Text 
Clatworthy and Jones (2006) Quantitative  UK listed companies’ chairman’s 
statements 
No – cross sectional Text 
Courtis (1998) Quantitative Hong Kong listed companies chairman’s 
statements 
No – cross sectional Text - readability 
Courtis (2004) Quantitative + 
experiment 
Hong Kong companies’ annual reports Yes Colour 
Dhanani and Connolly (2012) Quantitative Large UK charities’ annual reports and 
annual reviews 
No – cross sectional Text 
Godfrey et al. (2003) Quantitative  Australian listed companies’ financial 
reports 
Yes Graphs 
Hrasky (2012) Quantitative  Australian listed companies’ sustainability 
reports 
No – cross sectional Graphs and photographs 
Jones (2011) Quantitative UK companies’ sustainability reports No – cross sectional Graphs 
Merkl-Davis et al. (2011) Quantitative  UK listed companies chairman’s statements No – cross sectional Text 
Neu et al. (1998) Quantitative Canadian listed companies’ annual reports Yes Text 
Ogden and Clarke (2005) Mixed UK WASCs’ annual reports Yes, but no time 
series analysis 
Text 
Preston et al. (1996) Qualitative  US companies’ annual reports Yes, but no time 
series analysis 
Visual images 
Samkin and Schneider (2010) Qualitative NZ public sector annual reports Yes Text and photographs 
Table 3: WASC performance against OFWAT target. 
WASC Years target achieved Years target not met 
Anglian 2006-2010; 2012 2011 
Dŵr Cymru 2006-2010; 2012 2011 
Northumbrian 2006-2009; 2012 2010 and 2011 
Severn Trent 2008-2010; 2012 2006 and 2007; 2011 
South West (Pennon) 2006-2012 N/A 
Southern 2006-2009; 2012 2010 and 2011 
Thames 2007-2012 2006 
United Utilities 2007-2012 2006 
Wessex 2006-2012 N/A 
Yorkshire 2006-2009; 2012 2010 and 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: OFWAT and matched WASC reporting (Thames and United Utilities): 2005-06 and 2006-07. 
OFWAT Reporting Company leakage reporting 
2005-06 targets not met. 
 
Thames 
 
United Utilities 
Thames: 
This year, we have taken formal action 
against Thames Water, the company with the 
worst record on leakage control for its 
continuing failure to hit its leakage target (p.5). 
 
Of the three companies that failed their targets in 
2005-06, we have taken the strongest action 
against Thames. The company has given us a 
legally binding undertaking to meet future leakage 
targets and to spend an extra £150 million at its 
own cost to replace an additional 368 km of mains 
(p.8). 
 
United Utilities: 
This is the fourth consecutive annual target failure 
reported by United Utilities. United Utilities is 
now performing in line with its recovery action 
plan (p. 37). 
 
In 2005-06, United Utilities reported that leakage 
fell by 22 Ml/d to 477 Ml/d – a reduction of 4.4%. 
This was above the annual average target of 470 
Ml/d. Despite missing the annual average target, 
the company did meet all the interim targets for 
2005-06 set within its action plan (p. 47). 
 
Whilst there has been progress during the year in 
tackling leakage and sewer flooding, it is 
acknowledged that more needs to be done... We are 
also encouraging customers to think carefully about 
their use of water (Water Resources pp. 3-4). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Omission of target and actual performance. 
Omission of failure to achieve target. 
No visual effects. 
 
 
Looking beyond the financial bottom-line, the board 
has been pleased with progress on important areas 
such as customer service and leakage. (Chairman’s 
Review, p. 2). 
 
Graphic with large colour green and blue bold font 
showing: 
Spot leakage as at 31 March 2006 470 Ml/d 
31 March 2005: 519 Ml/d 
(Business Overview, p. 5).  
 
Leakage and water efficiency 
In north west England, United Utilities Water has 
halved water leakage since 1995 and met its spot 
target of 470 MI per day at the end of 2005/06.  
(Corporate Responsibility, p.30). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Omission of target and actual performance.  
Omission of failure to achieve target. 
Prominent visual effect (graphic) font, colour. 
Selective measurement of spot data and performance 
comparison to prior year. 
Self-promotion on leakage progress. 
2006-07 targets met. 
 
Thames 
 
United Utilities 
Thames: 
Thames has achieved the targets set for 2006-07, 
and we will continue to monitor its performance 
closely until the undertaking comes to an end in 
2010 (p. 2). 
 
We secured a legally binding undertaking from 
Thames in 2005-06 that committed the company to 
improving its performance, at its own expense, and 
delivering a score of 100 against its planned level 
of service by 2009-10.Thames has achieved its 
target for the first year of the undertaking, largely 
through a combination of lower leakage and better 
demand management (p.4). 
 
United Utilities: 
Other companies that failed their 12-month rolling 
average targets in 2005-06, United Utilities hit 
their target in 2006-07 (p. 7). 
 
Meeting the leakage target to 31 March 2007 was 
essential and I am pleased to say that this milestone 
was achieved, by a considerable margin (Chairman’s 
introduction, p. 3). 
 
Key outputs include meeting annual targets for 
leakage. (Operating Review, p.9) 
 
The failure to meet the 2005/06 leakage target, while 
needing to impose a hosepipe ban as a result of the 
drought, led to much critical comment from the media 
and other stakeholders. (Operating Review, p.9) 
 
The Company has delivered leakage savings that have 
met the required target for 2006/07, by a considerable 
margin.... This is gratifying for the Company, and 
particularly for the individuals whose efforts have 
made it possible. (Operating Review, p. 10). 
 
KPI table including actual leakage performance 
against OFWAT target and prior year actual (p. 29). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Prominent location of disclosure of meeting target, 
subsequently repeated three times. 
Entitlement, self-referencing and reinforcement of 
meeting target 
Disclosure of prior year target failure. 
Visual effect (table) showing target and actual 
performance and comparison with prior year. 
 
KPI table showing average annual leakage compared 
to prior year (restated for 2005-06 comparative) 
(Business Review, p. 2). 
 
We are already seeing some improvement in meeting 
our leakage performance target set by Ofwat (Chief 
Executive’s Report, p.5). 
 
Blue bubble graphic with large colour font showing: 
468Ml/d rolling annual average leakage 
We have achieved our economic level of leakage 
rolling target (Chief Executive’s Report. p. 6). 
 
Leakage level reduced to 468 megalitres per day 
(Performance summary, p. 28). 
 
Security of water supply – UUW met the economic 
level of leakage rolling target of 470 megalitres per 
day for 2006/07 for the first time in five years. 
(Business Review, p.28). 
 
Leakage 
In north west England, we have halved water leakage 
since 1995 and out-performed the rolling average 
target of 470 Ml per day for 2006/07 by achieving 
468 Ml per day, meeting our agreed target with 
Ofwat. (Corporate Responsibility, p. 35). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Prominent visual effect (table) showing actual 
performance and comparison (restated) with prior 
year. 
Visual effect (graphic), colour and font of target 
achievement. 
Prominent location of disclosure of meeting target, 
subsequently repeated four times and reinforced. 
Entitlement and self-referencing of meeting target. 
Disclosure of prior year target failure. 
Visual effect (bullet point and bold) on performance 
summary. 
 
 
Table 5: OFWAT and matched WASC reporting (Severn Trent): 2005-06 to 2007-08. 
OFWAT Reporting Severn Trent leakage reporting 
2005-06 target not met. 
 
2005-06 target not met. 
 
The company’s performance reflects its failure to 
achieve its leakage target. Should the company fail to 
deliver this output, we will make an appropriate 
adjustment to reflect the financial value of the 
shortfall at the next review of price limits in 2009 (p. 
20). 
 
We will continue to meet with Severn Trent on a 
regular basis in the coming year and monitor progress 
closely. Severn Trent is on notice that we will 
consider using our formal enforcement powers in the 
event of any future failures (p. 47). 
 
The one area of the AMP4 contract where our 2005/06 results were disappointing was leakage. The dry 
summer of 2005 contributed to this performance, causing higher than average levels of burst pipes. 
Reported actual leakage has increased by approximately 17 Megalitres per day, 3% greater than 2004/05. 
We have now increased the resources dedicated to detection and reduction of leakage, and we believe that, 
by the end of the AMP4 period, we can reduce our leakage figures to below the target level set by Ofwat. 
(Performance Review, p. 17). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Omission of target and actual performance. 
Obfuscation of failure to achieve current year target and target attainment within regulatory period. 
Excuse and justification of weather as causal factor. 
No visual effects. 
 
2006-07 target not met. 2006-07 target not met. 
This year we have taken action against Severn Trent 
over its deteriorating security of supply and the 
failure to meet its annual leakage target for the 
second year in succession. We secured a legal 
undertaking from the company that commits it to 
achieve future leakage and security of supply index 
targets until 2009-10. (p. 2). 
 
The company is now committed to overcoming 
scheme delays and spending an extra £45 million on 
reducing leakage, at shareholders’ expense. (p. 6 and 
repeated on p. 7). 
Our leakage increased in the prior year 2005/06. 
 
1We employed more people, invested in new leak detection technology, fixed 37,000 leaks, 8,000 more than 
the previous year and invested almost £20 million more than the previous year. This effort has reduced our 
leakage this year but it was not until the month of March 2007 that we attained a monthly level of leakage 
commensurate with our Ofwat annual target. Therefore, notwithstanding this reduction, we believe that we 
will not attain the annual average target level of leakage. 
 
We have kept Ofwat fully informed of our progress...In due course we will be discussing with Ofwat our 
ongoing plans and commitments to maintain our progress in reducing leakage. (Chief Executive’s Review, 
p. 7). 
 
1 All of the selected disclosure is repeated verbatim on page 14 (Business Review).  
 
                                                          
 
We will monitor Severn Trent’s performance closely 
through audited quarterly reports, and will take 
further enforcement action if it fails to deliver its 
commitments (p. 7). 
 
Leakage table showing current year only (DMA) (page 8). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Selectivity and prominent disclosure of prior year poor performance (increase in leakage) and current year 
leakage reduction. 
Disclosure over likely failure to meet target.  
Omission of target and actual performance. 
Visual effect (table), selective measurement (monthly District Metered Areas, DMA) for current year only. 
Repetition of leakage reduction. 
 
2007-08 target met. 2007-08 target met. 
Severn Trent passed its leakage target this year, after 
two years of failures. In 2007, we secured a legally 
binding undertaking from the company to meet its 
reduction targets. It has made significant reductions 
this year, and we are pleased with how the company 
has progressed. We will continue to monitor the 
company’s performance closely against the 
undertaking during 2008-09 through audited 
quarterly reports (p. 23). 
 
 
 
Large bold blue colour font showing: 
Delivering results 
• Outperformed against Ofwat 2007/08 leakage target 
(Inside front cover). 
 
Leakage 
We have outperformed our Ofwat target for 2007/08 having failed to meet this measure for the previous two 
years. (Chief Executive’s Review, p.6). 
 
Colour graphic with large blue colour font showing: 
KPI highlights: Leakage Ml/d 491 (large font) 
We have outperformed our leakage target 
(KPI highlights p.10) 
 
KPI table including leakage (p. 11). 
 
Meeting our leakage target 
We have outperformed our leakage target for 2007/08, after failing to meet it for the last two years. We are 
determined to maintain our performance…in line with our written commitment to Ofwat for the remaining 
years of AMP4. (Performance Review, p.16). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Prominent location and visual effect (font, colour, bullet) of meeting target. 
Repeated prominent location of disclosure of meeting target, entitlement and self-referencing, subsequently 
repeated two times. 
Reinforcement of meeting target. 
Disclosure of prior year target failures. 
Visual effect (graphic, colour, font) to show actual performance and exceeding target, reinforcement, 
entitlement and self-referencing.  
 Table 6: All targets met –leakage disclosure: 2005-06 to 2007-08.   
Pennon Wessex 
2005-06 
The company’s leakage detection and reduction programme continues to 
deliver results in line with mandatory targets set by Ofwat (Chairman’s 
Statement, p. 2) 
 
The company...has consistently met its Ofwat leakage target of 84 Ml/d 
(Business Review, p. 18). 
2005-06 
We have maintained leakage below the regulatory target and do not anticipate 
any supply problems in 2006 (Operational Review p. 2) 
 
Service to customers – KPI table comparing actual leakage with prior year and 
target (p. 11) 
 
2006-07 
We achieved our best ever leakage performance. We have achieved or beaten 
our leakage target in every year since targets were introduced by Ofwat in 
1999/2000 (Chief Executives Review, p.4). 
2006-07 
Reduced leakage below the target assessed for the 2004 price review to 72 
Ml/d (Highlights, p. 4). 
 
Reducing leakage to 72 Ml/d – which is 2 Ml/d below the economic level 
(Regulatory Commentary, p. 34) and OFWAT June return table comparing 
actual leakage with prior year and target. 
2007-08 
We achieved our target of keeping leakage at or below 84Ml/d. We have 
achieved or beaten our leakage target in every year since targets were 
introduced by Ofwat in 1999/2000 (Chief Executives Review, p.4). 
2007-08 
Leakage is currently 72Ml/d beating the Ofwat target of 74Ml/d. (Customer 
services, p.13). 
 
Service to customers – KPI table comparing actual leakage with prior year and 
target (p. 31) 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Consistent, clear and prominent reporting of target achievement. 
Little variation in annual disclosure. 
Evidence of consistent use of visual effect (tables) to show leakage performance against target and prior year. 
 
 
Table 7: OFWAT and matched WASC reporting (Severn Trent): 2008-09 to 2011-12. 
OFWAT Reporting Company reporting  
2008-09 to 2009-10: Targets met in all years. 2008-09 to 2009-10: Targets met in all years. 
No additional leakage reporting. 
 
2008-09 
Severn Trent is delivering performance in key areas: 
• Outperforming our leakage target 
(Highlights, p.1). 
 
KPI table showing leakage against prior year (Business Review, p. 8). 
 
Meeting our leakage target: Our leakage was 492 Ml/d in 2008/09. For the second year running...we have met 
our leakage target of 500 Ml/d set by Ofwat.... being able to reduce leakage becomes ever more important for 
our customers (Business Review, p. 10). 
 
2009-10 
For the third year running we achieved our leakage target (Business Review, p.10) 
 
KPI table showing leakage against prior year (Business Review, p. 11). 
 
…able to achieve Ofwat’s leakage target for the third successive year (2010, Business Review, p. 12). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Consistent and prominent reporting of target achievement. 
Repetition of meeting target. 
Consistent use of visual effect (table) to show leakage performance against prior year and industry quartile. 
Reinforcement and emphasis of meeting leakage target. 
2010-11 target not met. 2010-11 target not met. 
Despite the cold winter of 2010-11, most 
companies met their leakage targets. But six 
companies (Southern Water, Yorkshire Water, 
Northumbrian Water – in its north-east operating 
Leakage was above target as a result of the severe winter weather….We maintained our leakage at the same 
level as last year (Business Review p.7). 
 
Large graphic with large green (current year) and grey (prior year) colour font showing: 
area – Severn Trent Water, Anglian Water and 
Dŵr Cymru) failed. 
 
Dŵr Cymru, Severn Trent Water and 
Northumbrian Water (in its north east operating 
area) will each provide us with reports every 
three months on their performance. This is so we 
can require them to take further action quickly if 
their performance does not improve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leakage – megalitres per day (Ml/d) 
497: 2011; 497: 2010 (large font and bold) 
(Business Review, p. 12) 
 
Reducing leakage (green and bold font)  
We were able to maintain leakage at last year’s levels of 497 megalitres per day (Ml/d). However, despite 
deploying additional resources we were unable to achieve our leakage target of 483 Ml/d as a direct result of 
the weather. 
 
Colour graph of ‘Winter peaks 2007/08 to 2010/11: Weekly leakage April 2007 to March 2011’ showing 
increased peaks particularly in the winter of 2010/11 (a peak of approximately 800Ml/d, compared to a peak of 
approximately 650Ml/d in the winter of 2009/10 and peaks of less than 600Ml/d in earlier years)  
(Business Review, p. 13) 
 
KPI table showing leakage against prior year (p. 123). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Entitlement and performance comparison against prior year. 
Prominent visual effect (graphic, font, colour) to emphasise performance against prior year  
Disclosure of failure to achieve target. 
Excuse and justification of weather as causal factor, repeated a further six times. 
Visual effect (graph, colour) to emphasise weather. 
Visual effect (table) and disclosure performance comparison to prior year. 
 
2011-12 target met. 
 
2011-12 target met. 
 
No additional leakage reporting. Bold and bullet: Leakage reduced 7% year on year to a record low level and below OFWAT target (Highlights: 
Inside front cover and repeated Chairman’s Statement , p. 2) 
 
We have met our leakage targets: 
Large graphic of leakage levels with large bold font for current year leakage 464 Ml/d. 
 (Chief Executive’s review, p. 5). 
 
Leakage was reduced to a new low, ahead of our target (Chief Executive’s review, p. 6). 
 
Colour graphic with large blue colour font showing: 
Meeting leakage targets: 
We have achieved our lowest levels of leakage ever, and have beaten our Ofwat target of 474 Ml/d by 10 Ml/d 
(2%) 
Lowest levels of leakage achieved  
(Keeping customers happy: Business Review, p.15). 
 
Severn Trent is the only company to have targeted a significant reduction in leakage during AMP5. We were 
pleased to improve our performance again during the year. We cut leakage to 464 megalitres per day (Ml/d), 
compared to 497 Ml/d last year and our target of 474 Ml/d (Deploying water resources, p. 18). 
 
KPI table showing leakage against prior year page (p.139). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Prominent location and visual effect (bold, bullet) of disclosure of meeting target. 
Prominent reporting of target achievement, entitlement, repeated six times. 
Entitlement, reinforcement and visual effect (graphic, colour, font, italics) of meeting leakage target. 
Exemplification of leakage reduction in AMP5 period. 
Performance comparison to prior year and target 
Visual effect (table) of leakage compared to prior year. 
 
Table 8: OFWAT and matched WASC reporting (Southern, Northumbrian and Yorkshire): 2005-06 to 2011-12.  
OFWAT Reporting Examples of company leakage reporting 
Prior years targets met  
(2006-09). 
Southern Northumbrian Yorkshire 
No additional leakage 
reporting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All years 2006-09, leakage tables 
showing year on year actual leakage 
since 2006 and next year’s target level. 
 
All years 2006-09, disclosure of 
achieving leakage target and low 
industry levels on leakage. 
 
 
Leakage targets achieved 
(2008, Highlights, p.1 and very similar in 
2006 and 2007). 
 
Table showing comparison of actual 
levels with prior year and OFWAT 
leakage target (2007, p22 and 2008, p.22, 
repeated p.30). 
 
The leakage targets agreed with Ofwat 
have been met.... NWL…is playing a 
leading role in a review of leakage 
methodologies with the EA and Ofwat. 
(2009, Business Review, p.29).  
 
We achieved our leakage target for the 
tenth year running. 
(2008, Managing Director’s Review, 
p.1). 
 
We have achieved Ofwat’s leakage target 
for the tenth year running (2008, 
Business Review, p.5) 
 
We had a good year in terms of leakage 
reduction… turning out at 295Ml/d and 
we out-performed our regulatory target 
of 297.1Ml/d (2009, Business Review, p 
5). 
 Common reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Consistent disclosure of meeting target. 
Performance comparison of target attainment and actual leakage levels. 
Visual effect (tables) showing target and actual performance and comparison with prior year. 
Repetition of meeting target. 
2009-10 targets not met. Southern Northumbrian Yorkshire 
Most companies met their 
leakage targets, in spite of the 
unusually cold winter 
conditions. However, 
Southern, Northumbrian 
(and) Yorkshire failed to 
Southern Water’s aim is to beat annual 
leakage targets set by Ofwat (92 Ml/d for 
2009-10) maintaining its position as the 
water and sewerage company with the 
lowest leakage levels in the industry, 
measured on a per property basis 
The severe freeze…meant we, along 
with other companies, did not meet our 
annual targets this year although our 
three year rolling targets have again been 
met. 
(Operational Performance, p.35) 
Our aim is to be OFWAT’s frontier 
company for financial performance and 
to outperform our targets. 
(2010 Business Review, p. 6). 
 
Reporting of performance against 
meet their targets. We have 
focused on what these 
companies need to do to 
restore their performance and 
we have increased their 
reporting requirements while 
they do so. 
 
 
(Operating and Financial Review, p.4). 
 
Leakage table showing year on year 
actual leakage since 2006 and next year’s 
target level. 
 
Reporting of performance against 
OFWAT target: 
Obfuscation of failure to achieve target. 
Table to show prior year performance 
and future leakage target.  
Self-promotion and selectivity of 
measurement for industry positioning. 
 
 
Reporting of performance against 
OFWAT target: 
Obfuscation of failure to achieve target, 
through selectivity of attaining rolling 
targets and annual average measures. 
Excuse and justification of weather as 
causal factor. 
Diminution of failure by reference to 
other WASCs. 
No tables or other visual effects. 
OFWAT target: 
Omission of target and actual 
performance. 
Omission of failure to achieve target. 
Self-promotion of regulatory positioning. 
No tables or other visual effects. 
 
2010-11 targets not met. Southern Northumbrian Yorkshire 
Despite the cold winter of 
2010-11, most companies met 
their leakage targets. But six 
companies (Southern Water, 
Yorkshire Water, 
Northumbrian Water – in its 
north-east operating area – 
Severn Trent Water, Anglian 
Water and Dŵr Cymru) failed. 
 
Dŵr Cymru, Severn Trent 
Water and Northumbrian 
Water (in its north east 
operating area) will each 
provide us with reports every 
three months on their 
performance. This is so we can 
require them to take further 
action quickly if their 
Following three harsh winters...as a 
result we have been unable to achieve 
the challenging leakage targets that we 
set for ourselves, though we continue to 
have the lowest leakage levels of any of 
the ten water and sewerage companies in 
England and Wales... we remain 
committed to leading the industry on 
leakage (Operating and Financial 
Review, p.4). 
 
Southern Water’s aim is to beat annual 
leakage targets agreed with Ofwat. The 
target was 83 Ml/d for 2010-11. We are 
very disappointed to report that, despite 
finding and repairing a record 22,000 
leaks during the year, we have not met 
this target, with levels for the year being 
at 92 Ml/d... We are discussing these 
Yet again, the weather had a huge impact 
on our operations during the year. The 
worst winter in over 100 years posed 
many challenges for us. Due to the 
extraordinary work of teams across the 
company, supplies to our customers were 
not affected. I must pay tribute to those 
who worked in exceptionally hard 
conditions to guarantee supplies and to 
deal with the inevitably increased 
leakage quickly, although, in these 
circumstances, it was not possible to 
achieve our leakage target in the north. 
(Chairman’s Statement, p. 5) 
 
Table showing leakage targets for 2011-
12 only, no current year figures (p. 12). 
 
The severe freeze….as a result, we, 
Within a month we began implementing 
the plan with a view to reducing leakage 
to 297Ml/d by the end of the financial 
year. However with the cold winter 
weather of 2010/11 turning out to be 
even worse than that of the previous 
year, we finally out-turned at 325Ml/d. 
(Business Review, p. 7). 
 
Reporting of performance against 
OFWAT target: 
Disclosure of actual performance. 
Obfuscation of failure to achieve target. 
Excuse and justification of weather. 
No tables or other visual effects. 
 
 
performance does not improve. 
 
 
issues with Ofwat and hope to agree a 
revised target profile. 
 
Table showing current and past leakage 
performance showing improvement from 
prior year. (No targets shown) 
 
However, even at the reported level, our 
leakage levels remain the lowest of the 
ten water and sewerage companies in 
England and Wales (Operating and 
Financial Review, p.6). 
 
Reporting of performance against 
OFWAT target: 
Disclosure of target and actual 
performance. 
Disclosure of failure to achieve target 
Excuse and justification of weather as 
causal factor. 
Visual effect (table) but changed format 
showing current and prior year 
performance only – omission of target 
data as prior years. 
Self promotion and repetition of industry 
positioning. 
 
along with other companies, did not meet 
our annual leakage target. In our 
southern region, conditions were not 
quite so severe and we achieved our 
target. (Operational Performance, p.39). 
 
Reporting of performance against 
OFWAT target: 
Disclosure of failure to achieve target, 
but diminution by reference to other 
WASCs. 
Excuse and justification of weather as 
causal factor, repetition. 
Visual effect (table) showing leakage 
target only. 
2011-12 targets met. Southern Northumbrian Yorkshire 
No additional leakage 
reporting. 
In terms of leakage we recorded our 
lowest figure ever and beat the current 
target set by our regulator OFWAT by 
11 Ml/d. We remain the water and 
sewerage company with the lowest 
leakage level (Chief Executive’s review, 
Table showing comparison of actual 
levels with OFWAT leakage target 
(Business Review, p. 8). 
 
Throughout 2011/12, distribution input 
and leakage levels have been at their 
The success we achieved in driving 
down leakage … During 2011-12 we put 
significant additional resource into 
tackling leakage and reduced levels in 
our region to the lowest on record. 
(Chairman’s Review, p.1). 
p.3). 
 
Leakage table showing six year 
comparison of actual leakage levels. 
(Operating review, p. 7). 
 
Reporting of performance against 
OFWAT target: 
Prominent disclosure of meeting target. 
Repetition (four times), entitlement and 
reinforcement of meeting target. 
Self-promotion and repetition (four 
times) of industry positioning. 
Visual effect (table) showing current and 
prior year performance. 
lowest ever. Our final reported leakage 
figure has met our target comfortably 
(Environment, p.17). 
 
Reporting of performance against 
OFWAT target: 
Visual effect (table) to show target and 
actual performance. 
Entitlement and reinforcement of 
meeting target. 
 
Comfortably over achieve the leakage 
target of 297 Ml/d and achieve the 
lowest ever levels. (Business Review, p. 
4).  
 
Table showing comparison of actual 
levels with prior year and OFWAT 
leakage target. (Business Review, p. 4). 
 
Reporting of performance against 
OFWAT target: 
Prominent disclosure of meeting target. 
Visual effect (table) to show target and 
actual performance current and prior 
year. 
Repetition and reinforcement of meeting 
target. 
 
Table 9: OFWAT and matched WASC reporting (Anglian and  Dŵr Cymru): 2009-10 to 2011-12. 
OFWAT Reporting Company leakage reporting 
2009-10 targets met. Anglian Dŵr Cymru 
No additional leakage reporting. 
 
 
We met leakage target despite severe weather.  
Column chart showing current year (2009/10 
5.62m3/km/day in blue colour) and prior years 
leakage to 2005/06 (5.80 m3/km/day) in grey colour. 
(KPI review, p. 4). 
 
For the ninth year in succession, we have once again 
met our demanding targets on reducing leakage 
(Managing Director’s Statement, p. 6). 
 
We have one of the best records for leakage control in 
the UK water industry, meeting all our AMP4 targets 
and with water loss figures at around half the industry 
average. In spite of the severe winter weather of 
2009/10, we maintained our service levels and met 
our leakage target of 211.2 Ml/d (Business Review, 
p.31) 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Prominent location of disclosure of meeting target, 
subsequently repeated three times. 
Entitlement and reinforcement of meeting target 
Visual effect (column chart), actual performance and 
comparison with prior year. 
Performance comparison and self-promotion of 
industry positioning 
 
Last year we again achieved OFWAT’s leakage 
reduction target (Managing Director’s report, p. 2). 
 
KPI table comparing leakage against prior year and 
target. Tick boxes for respective performance. 
(Business Review, p. 7). 
 
In 2009-10 we met our mandatory target for leakage 
reduction, and over the last five years we have 
reduced by 33 mega litres per day (ml/d) or 15%. This 
means that leakage in our region, once one of the 
highest in the UK, is now in line with the industry 
average (Business Review, p. 15). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Prominent location and entitlement of meeting target, 
subsequently repeated three times. 
Visual effect (table and tick box) to show actual 
performance, target and comparison with prior year. 
Self-promotion of industry positioning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010-11 targets not met. Anglian Dŵr Cymru 
Despite the cold winter of 2010-11, most 
companies met their leakage targets. But six 
Our leakage rates are consistently almost half the 
industry average. 
Last year leakage was 199Mld (mega litres a day), 
9Mld above target and 3% higher than the previous 
companies (Southern Water, Yorkshire Water, 
Northumbrian Water – in its north-east operating 
area – Severn Trent Water, Anglian Water and 
Dŵr Cymru) failed. 
 
 
 
Column chart showing current year (2010/11 6.10 
m3/km/day in pink colour) and prior years leakage to 
05/06 (5.80 m3/km/day) and industry average for 
2009/10 (10.9 m3/km/day) in orange colour. 
(KPI review, p. 4). 
  
In contrast to some other areas of the UK, we 
maintained supplies to our customers, which included 
increasing water put into supply and maintaining or 
increasing pressure to guarantee water supplies. As a 
consequence our total leakage for 2010/11 was 229 
Ml/d; which was above our target in the north of the 
region where the conditions were most severe. 
However, in the south east of the region leakage 
levels were lower than last year. Our underlying 
leakage levels remain amongst the lowest in our 
sector; we have met our leakage targets for the last 
eight years (Business Review, p. 29). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Concealment of target failure and claims of meeting 
target by region or historically.  
Visual effect (table), actual performance, comparison 
with prior year and industry average. 
Performance comparison and self-promotion of 
industry positioning repeated three times. 
 
 
year. Over the last 16 years we have reduced our 
leakage by more than half from 413 Ml/d to 199 Ml/d. 
(Managing Director’s Report, p. 4). 
 
KPI table comparing leakage against prior year with 
tick box (Business Review, p.7). No target figure. 
 
The last winter was one of the harshest on record and 
for the first time since targets were introduced by 
Ofwat we did not meet our target for leakage 
reduction (Our performance, p. 10) 
 
Graph (visual effect) showing ten year trend in 
leakage reduction from 224 Ml/d in 2001-02 to 199 
Ml/d in 2010-11 (p. 18). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Prominent disclosure of failure to meet target, 
subsequently repeated three times. 
Disclosure of actual and target leakage. 
Table (visual effect), performance comparison with 
prior year. 
Excuse and justification of weather 
Visual effect (graph) to show leakage reduction, 
obfuscating final year increase (measurement 
distortion). 
2011-12 targets met. Anglian Dŵr Cymru 
No additional leakage reporting. Colour graphic with large font showing: 
6% in bold and purple colour 
We beat our leakage target by over 6% this year. 
 (Inside front cover) 
 
Beating our leakage target (set by Ofwat) by over 6% 
Graph under the caption ‘Leakage is at an all time 
low’ showing leakage falling from approximately 250 
Ml/d in 2001/02 to less than 200 Ml/d in 2011/12.  
(Inside front cover) 
 
We achieved our target for the year, bringing leakage 
– the lowest ever level of leakage (Highlights, p. 2) 
 
Beaten (in purple colour and bold font) our leakage 
target by over 6% (Performance, p. 4) 
 
This year we achieved our best ever performance on 
leakage to reflect our commitment to securing supply 
to our customers and protect our environment against 
potential drought . 
Table of actual and prior year performance (KPI 
review, p. 6) 
 
Large purple colour water drop graphic with large 
font showing: 
Our regulatory target for 2011/12 was beaten by over 
6% 
(Business Review, p. 26)  
At around half the national average, our leakage level 
is the lowest ever recorded, making Anglian Water an 
industry leader for 2011/12 (Business Review, p. 41) 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Prominent location and visual effects (graphics, 
colour and font) of disclosure of meeting target, 
repeated five times. 
Entitlement and reinforcement of meeting target. 
Performance comparison and self-promotion of 
industry positioning. 
Ingratiation to stakeholders (customers and 
environment). 
Visual effect (table), actual performance, comparison 
with prior year and industry average. 
down to a lowest ever level. 
(Operational Review, p.10) 
 
Bar chart under the caption ‘Protecting the 
Environment: Leakage (Ml/d)’ showing leakage in 
2011 at Ml/d: 2012 at 185Ml/d with tick to show 
comparison (and achievement) with target 
(Performance Review, p. 20). 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Prominent location and visual effects (colour and 
graphics) of disclosure of actual leakage levels, 
repeated four times. 
Disclosure of meeting target, repeated three times. 
Visual effect (graph) showing leakage reduction, 
rescaled. 
 
Table 10: All targets met –leakage disclosure: 2009-10 to 2011-12.   
Pennon Wessex 
2009-10 
Despite the coldest winter for nearly 30 years causing a surge in burst pipe 
incidents for both our customers and network, we still beat our leakage control 
target of 84 Megalitres per day (Ml/d), and achieved a best ever performance of 
82 Ml/d. We have now achieved or beaten our leakage targets every year since 
they were first introduced by Ofwat in 1999/2000. Our leakage rate remains 
amongst the lowest in the industry 
(Chief Executive’s Review, p. 9). 
 
2009-10 
Kept leakage within our target level, despite the major increase in bursts caused 
by the very cold winters this year and last (highlights, p. 1, repeated business 
Review, p. 5). 
 
Service to customers – KPI table comparing actual leakage with cycle average 
and target (p. 11) 
 
Although it remains within our monitoring plan target, leakage increased from 
72.2ML/d last year to 73.9ML/d this year as a result of cold conditions at the 
start of 2010 (p. 17). 
2010-11 
Highlights of the year: Industry leading performance in tackling leakage (Inside 
front cover) 
 
Our water losses from leakage are the lowest in the country (Chief Executive’s 
Review, p. 5). 
 
2010/11 notable achievements: 
Successfully met annual leakage target in spite of coldest December in England 
in the last 100 years,...Industry-leading performance in tackling leakage 
(Business Review , p. 8) 
 
This year the company again successfully met both its annual and three-year 
rolling leakage targets and has done so ever since leakage targets were 
originally set by Ofwat (Business Review, p. 10). 
2010-11 
Despite the prolonged sub-zero temperatures and snow cover during 
December 2010 and the subsequent rapid thaw in January 2011, we not only cut 
leakage but also met a challenging new target (Chairman’s Statement p. 1) 
 
Cut leakage and met our new leakage target (Highlights, p. 3) 
 
Service to customers – KPI table comparing actual leakage with cycle average 
and target (p. 11) 
 
Despite the prolonged sub-zero conditions and snow cover during December 
2010 we have cut leakage from 74ML/d and met our new target of 71ML/d 
(Leakage, p. 20) 
2011-12 
Highlights of the year: Industry leading performance in tackling leakage (Inside 
front cover) 
 
Best ever leakage results 
15th consecutive year without water restrictions. Best ever and industry-leading 
leakage control performance (Business Review, p.12). 
2011-12 
We once again beat our leakage target (Highlights, p.3) 
 
Service to customers – KPI table comparing actual leakage with cycle average 
and target (p. 5) 
 
Our innovative schemes and our efforts to bring leakage down to 15%, amongst 
the lowest in Europe (p. 35) 
 
Reporting of performance against OFWAT target: 
Consistent and prominent reporting of target achievement. 
Self-promotion and performance comparison against industry. 
Reinforcement and enhancement of performance despite the weather conditions 
Consistent use of tables or charts to show leakage performance against target and prior year. 
 
 
 
